Secure refinements of communication channels by Cheval, Vincent et al.
Secure refinements of communication channels
Vincent Cheval, Ve´ronique Cortier, Eric Le Morvan
To cite this version:
Vincent Cheval, Ve´ronique Cortier, Eric Le Morvan. Secure refinements of communication
channels. FSTTCS 2015, Dec 2015, Bangalore, India. 2015. <hal-01238094>
HAL Id: hal-01238094
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01238094
Submitted on 4 Dec 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Secure refinements of communication channels
Vincent Cheval1,3, Véronique Cortier2, and Eric le Morvan2
1 School of Computing, University of Kent, UK
2 LORIA, CNRS, France
3 LORIA, INRIA, France
Abstract
It is a common practice to design a protocol (say Q) assuming some secure channels. Then the secure
channels are implemented using any standard protocol, e.g. TLS. In this paper, we study when such a
practice is indeed secure.
We provide a characterization of both confidential and authenticated channels. As an application,
we study several protocols of the literature including TLS and BAC protocols. Thanks to our result,
we can consider a larger number of sessions when analyzing complex protocols resulting from explicit
implementation of the secure channels of some more abstract protocol Q.
1 Introduction
When designing a protocol, it is common to assume a secure, confidential, or authentic channel.
Authentic channels may be read but not written in. Symmetrically, confidential channels may be
written in but not read. Secure channels are both authentic and confidential. For example, payment
protocols like 3D-secure are supposed to be run over a secure channel such as TLS. Similarly, many
services such as public key registration assume an authenticated channel. How to implement these
secure channels is left unspecified and, intuitively, the security of a payment protocol should not
depend on the particular choice of implementation of its secure channels. A typical example of a
popular and generic realization of a secure channel is TLS. For authentication, one usually relies
on a password-based authentication or on previously established keys (used e.g. for signature or
MACs). Is it safe to use these protocols in any context? What is a secure or authenticated channel?
This paper aims at characterizing channels that have security properties. For example, assume Q is a
secure protocol (e.g. a payment protocol) that requires a secure channel. Which properties should a
protocol P achieve in order to securely realize the secure channels of Q? These properties should of
course be independent of Q since P and Q are typically designed in totally independent contexts. In
the remaining of this introduction, Qwill refer to the “main” protocol while P will refer to a protocol
realizing secure channels (for several notions of security).
Our contributions. Our first contribution is a characterization of both secure, confidential, and
authenticated channels. We actually characterize what it means for a channel to be readable or not,
and writable or not. Then the realization of a secure channel typically proceeds in two phases. First,
some values are established by the protocol P, for example short-term symmetric keys or MAC keys.
Quite unsurprisingly, we show that these values need to be secret and appropriately shared. Then
the messages of Q are transported or encapsulated using the values established by P. For example,
the messages of Q may be encrypted with a key established by P. We provide a characterization
of secure encapsulations both for secure, confidential, and authentic channels. A key feature of
our characterization is that it is independent of P and Q, which allows for a modular analysis. We
show that standard encapsulations (e.g. typical use of encryption, signatures, or MACs) enjoy the
requested properties.
Our second and main contribution is to show how to securely compose protocols. Intuitively,
our main result guarantees that whenever P is a secure key exchange protocol and E is a secure
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encapsulation then P ·E Q is as secure as Q where P ·E Q denotes the protocol obtained from Q by
implementing its secure channels using P and E.
The interest of our result is twofolds. First, it provides foundational grounds to a common
practice where protocols are typically designed and studied independently and then combined. We
show that such a practice is actually secure under reasonably light assumptions: primitives shared
between P, E, and Q should be tagged as proposed in [4]. Tagging is a standard practice that avoids
message confusion. Second, our result provides a technique for analyzing a complex protocol: it is
sufficient to analyse its components to deduce security of the whole protocol. To express and prove
our result, we have developed a framework, an extension of the applied-pi calculus [2], that allows
to easily talk about protocols roles and sessions, a missing aspect in the applied-pi calculus.
To illustrate our approach, we show that TLS is a secure implementation of secure channels.
Similarly we show that the BAC protocol [1] is also a secure implementation of a secure channel
and may be safely used with the Passive Authentication (PA) protocol as prescribed for the biometric
passport [1]. Using the CL-Atse tool [18], we analyse several combined protocols. Thanks to our
combination result, it is possible to analyse protocols in isolation instead of their combination, which
allows to consider a larger number of sessions.
Related work. One seminal work on composition is the one of Guttman and Thayer [13]. They
show that two protocols can be composed without one damaging the security of the other as soon
as they are “independent”. However, this independence notion needs to be checked for any protocol
execution and cannot be statically checked at the protocol specification level. Later, Guttman [11]
provides a criterion on the specification of P and Q such that P can be safely composed with Q.
Intuitively, Q should not break some invariant satisfied by P and conversely. While the work of [11]
focuses on authentication and secrecy properties, [12] more generally devises a framework for de-
fining protocol goals and designing, step by step, protocols that fulfill them. In [10], the strand space
model is used in a modular way, to analyse protocols components by components. The disjunction
criteria cannot be checked statically. All these approaches provide a framework that allows to reason
modularly when analysing the combination of two protocols P and Q, typically expressing invari-
ants satisfied by P that are shown sufficient to prove security of Q. This simplifies the proof of P
combined with Q but requires the knowledge of both protocols. Compared to our work, we propose
a criteria for a protocol P to securely implement a secure channel, independently of the protocol Q
that will use it (provided primitives are tagged).
Under tagging assumptions similar to ours, it was already shown that P and Q can be safely run
in parallel even if they share long-term keys [7]. In passing, we generalize this result to the case
where long-term keys may be used as payload. [6] explains when two protocols may be used se-
quentially, with Q using data established by P. The main difference with our work is that messages
may not be transformed when composing protocols. Therefore, [7, 6] cannot be used to (securely)
implement abstract channels. Note also that [6] may not consider compromised sessions, that is ses-
sions between honest and dishonest agents. The problem we address here is referred to as sequential
composition in [16], where the messages of Q are used as payloads in the composed protocol P ·E Q.
[16] provides a nice exposition of the generic problem of a protocol Q using a protocol P as sub-
protocol and lists sufficient (semantical) conditions for combining two protocols. These conditions
require again the knowledge of both P and Q.
Datta et al. (e.g. [8]) have also studied secure protocol composition in a broader sense: protocols
can be composed in parallel, sequentially or protocols may use other protocols as components. How-
ever, they do not provide any syntactic conditions for a protocol P to be safely executed in parallel
with other protocols. For any protocol P’ that might be executed in parallel, they have to prove that
the two protocols P and P’ satisfy each other invariants. Their approach is thus rather designed for
component based design of protocols.
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2 Model
Our model is inspired from the applied-pi calculus [2], extended to an explicit notion of roles.
2.1 Messages
Messages are modeled using a typed term algebra. We assume an infinite set of namesN = ND⊎NH
of base type and a set Ch of names of channel type. The set NH (resp. ND) represents the names
accessible by honest (resp. dishonest) agents. We also a consider an infinite set of variables X
and a finite signature F of function symbols operating and returning terms of base type. More
precisely, we consider F = Fc ⊎Fcst ⊎ Fkey where Fcst contains only constants, all functions in Fkey
are unary, and Fc = {〈 〉/2, f1/n1, . . . , fk/nk} contains the binary function symbol 〈 〉 used to denote
concatenation and other function symbols fi of arity ni. Terms are defined as names, variables and
function symbols applied to other terms. The set of terms built from N ⊆ N ∪ Ch, X ⊆ X and by
applying the function symbols in F ⊆ F is denoted by T (F,N ∪ X). We denote by st(t) the set of
subterms of t. We denote by vars(t) (resp. names(t)) the set of variables (resp. names) in t. When
vars(t) = ∅, we say that t is ground. To represent events that may occur during a protocol execution,
we assume an infinite signature Ev distinct from F . We say that a term e(t1, . . . , tn) with e ∈ Ev and
t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (F ,N ∪ X) is an event.
◮ Example 1. A standard signature to represent encryption and signature is Fstd, the signature
built from a finite set of constants, functions Fcstd = {senc/2, aenc/2, sign/2, h/1, 〈〉/2} and Fkstd =
{pk/1, vk/1}. The function symbol senc (resp. aenc) represents the symmetric (resp. asymmetric)
encryption. We denote by pk(s) the public key associated s. The function symbol sign represents
the digital signature where vk(s) is the verification associated to s. We write 〈u, v〉 as syntactic sugar
for 〈〉(u, v).
We model the algebraic properties of the cryptographic primitives by a set of inference rules I
composed of composition and decomposition rule described as follows:
x1 ... xk
f-comp
f(x1, ..., xk)
〈x1, x2〉
x1
〈x1, x2〉
x2
f(x, u1, . . . , un) v1 ... vm
f-decompx
where for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, u j, vk ∈ T (Fkey,X) and vars(v1, . . . , vk) ⊆
{u1, . . . , un, x}. For each f ∈ F , the set I contains a unique f-comp rule and there is no f-decomp
rule when f ∈ Fkey. Given a set or sequence of terms S and a term t, the deducibility relation is in-
ductively defined as follows. The term t is deducible from S , denoted S ⊢ t, when t ∈ S ∪Fcst ∪ND
or there exists a substitution σ and an inference rule in I with premisses u1, . . . , un and conclusion
u such that t = uσ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, S ⊢ uiσ.
◮ Example 2. Continuing Example 1, we define the set Istd of decomposition rules as follows.
senc(x, y) y
x
aenc(x, pk(y)) y
x
sign(x, y) vk(y)
x
〈x, y〉
x
〈x, y〉
y
We have that senc(〈a, c〉, k), k ⊢ a but aenc(〈a, c〉, pk(k)), pk(k) 0 a.
2.2 Agents
In standard process algebra (e.g. [2]), the notion of agents is usually implicit. Typically, a process that
models the behavior of the different honest agents is a single process where all agents are implicitly
represented. However, to model protocol composition, we need to explain how to compose each role
and thus we need to talk about each agent separately. Therefore, we explicit the presence of agents
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in our model. Interestingly, our model may also be used to specify semi-honest agents which may
directly communicate with the attacker during the protocol execution, still hiding some secrets from
him. We consider an infinite set of agentsAgt = {A, B, . . .} = AgtH ⊎AgtD whereAgtH andAgtD
represent respectively honest and dishonest agents. Each agent possesses private data such as keys.
Therefore, we consider NAgt a subset of N as an infinite partition NAgt =
⊎
A∈AgtNA where NA
intuitively are the names accessible by the agent A. By convention, k[A] denotes a name in NA.
2.3 Protocols
In the spirit of [2], we model protocols through a process algebra. We represent explicitly confiden-
tial, secure, and authenticated channels. Formally, we partition the set of channels into three infinite
sets Ch = Cha⊎Chc⊎Chs ⊎Chp where Cha,Chc,Chs,Chp respectively represent the sets of authen-
ticated, confidential, secure and public channels. The syntax of our calculus is as follows:
Roles of agent A
RA,R
′
A
:= 0 | outA(c, u).RA | inA(c, v).RA | new k.RA | eventA(ev).RA
Channel and agent declarations
C,C′ := RA | newta c.C | C | C
′
Processes
P,Q := C | P | Q | !P | ag(A,A,Kpub,Kprv).P
where c ∈ Ch, A ∈ Agt, ta is the tuple of agents in C such that c occurs in their role, k is name,
u and v are terms, ev is an event, Kpub and Kprv are sets of ground terms with names(Kpub) ⊆ NA,
names(Kprv) ⊆ NAgt andA ⊆ Agt.
The behavior of an agent A is described in a role RA that consists of a sequence of inputs, outputs,
creations of names and emissions of events. The role outA(c, u).RA outputs the term u on the channel
c and then behaves like RA. The role inA(c, v).RA inputs a message from channel c and expects it to
be an instance of v. The role new k.RA generates a fresh name k. Processes express how the roles
of different agents are combined. The process newta c allocates an abstract channel to the agents in
ta. The process P | Q expresses the parallel execution of P and Q. The process !P represents the
replication of P. The process ag(A,A,Kpub,Kprv).P selects a new agent A amongstA. The setKpub
typically indicates the public keys of A while Kprv contains the (secret) long term keys known by
A. The variables in a role are uniquely bound by the first input in which they appear. The channels
are bound by the operators new . The agents in a process are also bound by agent creation. In
a protocol, we assume that a name or variable is syntactically bound only once. A variable (resp.
agent, channel) that is not bound in P is free. We denote by f a(P), ba(P), f v(P), bv(P), f n(P) and
bn(P) the sets of free and bound agents, variables and names in P respectively. We say that P is
closed when f v(P) = ∅. Given a process P and an agent A, we denote by namesA(P) and chA(P) the
sets of names, channels that occur in the roles of A in P.
A role is executable if it only outputs terms that may be deduced from its inputs, the generated
values (nonces and keys), and the long-term keys used in the role.
◮ Definition 3. Let RA = r1. . . . .rn be a role of an agent A. We say that RA is executable when for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if ri = outA(c, u) then names(r1, . . . , ri) ∪ S ⊢ u where S = {v | j < i ∧ (r j =
inA(d, v) ∨ r j = new v)}. A process P is executable when all the roles in P are executable.
The state of a protocol during its execution is represented by a configuration (P,Φ, µ, θ) where P
is a closed process, Φ is a sequence of ground terms representing the knowledge of the attacker, µ is
a mapping from channels to sets of terms representing the messages sent over non-public channels
and θ is a mapping from triplets of channel, agent, tuple of agents to sets of channels. The semantics
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(P | outA(c, u).RA,Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | RA,Φ
′, µ′, θ) where Φ′ = Φ if c ∈ Chc ∪ Chs Out
else Φ′ = Φ · [u] and µ′ = rect(c, u, µ) if c < Chp else µ
′ = µ
(P | inA(c, v).RA,Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | RAσ,Φ, µ, θ) if there exists σ such that In
dom(σ) = vars(v) and either vσ ∈ cµ or else c ∈ Chp ∪ Chc and Φ ⊢ vσ
(P | new k.RA,Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | RA{
k′/k},Φ, µ, θ) New-k
with k′ fresh in NH if A ∈ AgtH else k
′ ∈ ND
(P | newta c.C[RA1 , . . . ,RAn],Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | [R
′
A1
, . . . ,R′
An
],Φ, µ, θ′) New-c
∀i,R′
Ai
= RAi if c < ch(RAi) else R
′
Ai
= RAi {
cAi /c} with cAi ∈ Chp if ta ∩AgtD , ∅ else
cAi ∈ S ∪
⋃
B∈ta θ(c, B, ta) r θ(c, Ai, ta) and S ⊆ Cha fresh (resp. Chc, Chs) if c ∈ Cha
(resp. Chc, Chs). Moreover, θ = θ
′ if ta ∩AgtD , ∅ else θ
′ = recc({(cA, A)}A∈ta, ta, c, θ).
(P | !Q,Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | !Q | Qρ,Φ, µ, θ) with ρ a fresh renaming of vars(Q) Repl
(P | eventA(ev).R,Φ, µ, θ)
ev
−→ (P | R,Φ, µ, θ) Event
(P | ag(A,A,Kpub,Kprv).Q,Φ, µ, θ)→ (P | Qσ,Φ · S , µ, θ) Agent
with σ = {A
′
/A}, A
′
< f a(Q), S = Kpubσ if A
′ ∈ A ∩AgtH else S = Kpubσ · Kprvσ
Figure 1 Semantics of configuration
is given in Figure 1. The rule Out indicates that the attacker obtains messages on public or authen-
ticated channels. In this rule, rect(c, t, µ) is the mapping µ′ where t was recorded as being sent over
c. Formally, µ′(c′) = µ(c′) for any c′ , c and µ′(c) = µ(c) ∪ {t}. With rule In the attacker can
inject on c any message that he can deduce from his knowledge when c is a public or confidential
channel. He can also relay any message that was previously sent on c. The rule New-k generates
a fresh name of NH or ND depending on whether the agent A is honest or not. The rule New-c
allocates to the role of an agent a channel possibly fresh or that has already been used by other roles
in different sessions. In this rule, recc(S , ta, c, θ) is the mapping θ in which we record the channels
allocated to the agents. Formally, θ′(c′, A′, ta′) = θ(c′, A′, ta′) for any A′ < ta′ or (c′, ta′) , (c, ta),
and θ′(c, A, ta) = θ(c, A, ta) ∪ {d} for any (d, A) ∈ S . The rule Agent selects an agent from A and
adds Kpub to the knowledge of the attacker. Additionally, if the agent is dishonest, the rules adds
Kprv. When (P,Φ, µ, θ)
e1
−→ . . .
en
−→ (P′,Φ′, µ′, θ′), we write (P,Φ, µ, θ)
e1·...·en
====⇒ (P′,Φ′, µ′, θ′).
◮ Example 4. An electronic passport is a paper passport containing a RFID chip that stores most of
the information printed on the passport. The protocols used to access these private data are specified
in the International Civil Aviation Organization standard [1]. Before exchanging any private data,
an electronic passport and a reader must establish session keys through a key-exchange protocol,
called Basic Access Control (BAC), that prevents eavesdropping on further communication. The
BAC protocol relies on two keys ke and km that are printed on the passport and thus can be obtained
by the reader through optical scanning. We described below the BAC protocol, between a passport
(P) and a reader (R). We assume encrypted messages to be tagged with a. The use of tagging will
be explained later on.
R → P : challenge
P → R : nP
R → P : 〈senc(〈a, nR, nP, kR〉, ke),mac(〈a, senc(〈a, nR, nP, kR〉, ke)〉, km)〉
P → R : 〈senc(〈a, nP, nR, kP〉, ke),mac(〈a, senc(〈a, nP, nR, kP〉, ke)〉, km)〉
After receiving a challenge command from the reader, the passport generates a fresh name nP that
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will be used to verify the authenticity of the messages he will receive later on. Upon receiving nP,
the reader generates two nonces nR, kR and sends back to the passport all three nonces encrypted
with the key ke and a mac with the key km. The nonce nR has also an authenticity purpose whereas
kR will be the reader’s contribution to the session keys. The passport then checks the mac using
km and the cipher by decrypting it using ke and verifying the presence of nP in the plain text. If all
verifications succeed, the passport generates a nonce kP, the passport’s contribution to the session
keys, and sends it to the reader. At the end of the protocol, both reader and passport know kR and
kP that they use to generate two session keys f1(kR, kP) and f2(kR, kP). In our syntax, the roles of the
reader (RR) and of the passport (RP) can be expressed as follows.
RP = inP(c, challenge).new nP.outP(c, nP).inP(c, 〈M,mac(〈a,M〉, km[P])〉).
new kP.outP(c, 〈N,mac(〈a,N〉, km[P])〉).0
RR = outR(c, challenge).inR(c, z).new kR.new nR.outR(c, 〈U,mac(〈a,U〉, km[P])).
inR(c, 〈V,mac(〈a,V〉, km[P])〉).0
with c ∈ Chp, M = senc(〈a, x, nP, y〉, ke[P]),N = senc(〈a, nP, x, kP〉, ke[P]),U = senc(〈a, nR, z, kR〉,
ke[P]) and V = senc(〈a, z, nR,w〉, ke[P]). An honest reader communicatingwith unbounded number
of passports, possibly dishonest, can be modeled in our calculus as the process:
BAC = ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P]}).(RP | RR)
whereP is an infinite set of agents containing honest and dishonest agents and R < P. The following
trace would correspond to the execution of a session with a dishonest passport I and a session of an
honest one A both in P.
(BAC, ∅, ∅, ∅)→∗ (BAC | ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P]}).(RP | RR), ∅, ∅, ∅)
→ (BAC | RPσA | RRσA, ∅, ∅, ∅)
→∗ (BAC | RPσA | RRσA | RPσI | RRσI , [ke[I], km[I]], ∅, ∅)
→ (BAC | RPσA | RRσA | RPσI | Q, [ke[I], km[I], challenge], ∅, ∅)
→∗ . . .
where PσA = A, PσI = I and σA, σI also are fresh renaming of bound variables and names and
RRσI = outI(c, challenge).Q. By convention the empty mapping µ = ∅ (resp. θ = ∅) denotes the
mapping that maps any argument to the emptyset: µ(c) = ∅ (resp. θ(c, A, ta) = ∅) for any c, A, ta.
3 Composition
In the previous section, we have defined an abstract notion of confidential, secure, and authenticated
channels. In practice, such channels are realized through cryptographic means. Agents first execute
some key establishment protocol in order to generate secret session keys. Then they encapsulate
the messages supposedly sent over a channel using these session keys. A standard case for secure
channels consists in using session keys to encrypt subsequent messages. How to encrypt the message
is defined by the encapsulation. In Section 3.1, we provide a generic definition of encapsulations and
identify properties needed for encapsulations to allow for authentication, confidential, and secure
channels. We continue in Section 3.2 by characterizing the composition of a key establishment
protocol with a process using abstract channels.
3.1 Encapsulation
For our composition result, we tag encapsulations and processes. These tags are used to distinguish
the parts of a message that correspond to encapsulations from the ones coming from processes.
Formally, a tag is a constant from Fcst, hence known to the attacker. Given a set Tag ⊆ Fcst, we say
that a term t is a Tag-term when for all t′ ∈ st(t), if t′ = f(t1, . . . , tn) for some f ∈ Fc\{〈 〉} and some
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terms t1, . . . , tn then t1 = 〈a, u〉 for some term u and a ∈ Tag.
◮ Definition 5. A Tag-encapsulation is a pair (E,F) where E is a Tag-term of T (F ,X) and F ⊆
T (Fkey,X) such that vars(E) = {x, x1, . . . , xn}, {E, x1, . . . , xn} ⊢ x and for all t ∈ st(E),
if t = f(v) with f ∈ Fkey then v ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} ∪ Fcst
if t = f(w, t1, . . . , tn) and there exists a f-decomposition rule with f(x, u1, . . . , un), v1, . . . , vm as
premises then for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, v j = g(y) and y ∈ vars(ui) implies
ti ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} ∪ Fcst. Intuitively, if a f-decomposition rule may be applied to a subterm of an
encapsulation using a non atomic key g(ti) then ti must be a variable or a constant.
We denote x by tE and (x1, . . . , xn) by XE. Given two encapsulations (E,F) and (E
′,F′), we write
E ∼ E′ when there exists a renaming ρ such that Eρ = E′, Fρ = F′, tEρ = tE′ and XEρ = XE′ . We
denote by E(t, t1, . . . , tn) the term obtained from E by substituting x by t and xi by ti.
In an encapsulation (E,F), the variable tE will be instantiated by the message sent on the channel
implemented by the encapsulation whereas the variables in XE will be instantiated by the session
keys. Note that {E, x1, . . . , xn} ⊢ x indicates that an encapsulated messages may always be retrieved
using the session keys. The terms in F represent the public keys that can be used to deduce the term
encapsulated or to generate an encapsulation with a new message without revealing the session keys.
◮ Example 6. In Example 4, we described how the session keys f1(kR, kP) and f2(kR, kP) are es-
tablished in the BAC protocol. The ICAO standard states that in any other protocol executed
after BAC, the messages exchanged should be of the form 〈u,mac(〈b, u〉, f1(kR, kP))〉 with u =
senc(〈b,M〉, f2(kR, kP)) for some data M and tag b. This represents in fact the encapsulation of
M with the session keys f1(kR, kP) and f2(kR, kP). In our formalism, the encapsulation is defined as
(EBAC, ∅) where EBAC = 〈t,mac(〈b, t〉, x2)〉 with t = senc(〈b, x〉, x1), tEBAC = x and XEBAC = (x1, x2).
We use tags to distinguish the encapsulations from the messages actually sent over the network.
However, a process can implement different types of channels using different encapsulations with
the same tags. We need to ensure that the security of an encapsulation is not compromised when
used with other encapsulations. Therefore, to state the different properties that encapsulations must
satisfy, we consider a set of encapsulations and not only a unique one.
These conditions are easily met by standard encapsulations.
◮ Definition 7. Let Se = Sa⊎Sc⊎Ss be a set of Tag-encapsulations. We say that Se allows authen-
tic, confidential and secure channels if the following properties are satisfied: Let (E1,F1), . . . , (En,
Fn) ∈ Se. Assume that the variables in E1, . . . ,En are disjoint. Let σ be a ground substitution such
that dom(σ) = vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be a ground frame such that Tag ∩ st(σ,Φ) = ∅. Let I be
the set of i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ.
1. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀u ∈ T (Fkey,XEiσ), if Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ u then Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ u.
2. For all i, i′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀u ∈ st(Ei)rX, ∀v ∈ st(Ei′ )rX, if u and v are unifiable and root(u) , {〈 〉}
then img(mgu(u, v)) ⊂ X.
Moreover, an encapulation is authentic, that is (Ei,Fi) ∈ Sa if it satisfies the properties [Can
read] and [Cannot write]. An encapulation is confidential, that is (Ei,Fi) ∈ Sc if it satisfies the
properties [Cannot read] and [Can write]. Finally, an encapulation is secure, that is (Ei,Fi) ∈ Sc if
it satisfies the properties [Cannot read] and [Cannot write].
For all ground substitution σ′ such that Tag ∩ st(σ′) = ∅, if we denote J = I − i then
3. [Can read] [Ei] · Fi ⊢ tEi
4. [Cannot read] Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ implies Φ · [tEkσ]k∈J ⊢ tEiσ ∨ ∃x ∈ XEi .Φ · [tEkσ]k∈J ⊢ xσ
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5. [Can write] Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′ is equivalent to ϕ ∨
(
Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ tEiσ
′ ∧ Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ Fiσ
′
)
6. [Cannot write] Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′ implies either ϕ or the following property:
∃x ∈ XEi .Φ
′ ⊢ xσ′ ∧
(
(∃ j ∈ N.tEiσ
′ = tE jσ ∧ XEiσ
′ ∩ XE jσ , ∅) ∨ Φ
′ ⊢ tEiσ
′)
)
where ϕ = ∃ j ∈ N.(Ei ∼ E j ∧ Eiσ
′ = E jσ), N = {1, . . . , n} and Φ
′ = Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I .
The set Sa (resp. Sc, Ss) represents the sets of encapsulations that can be used to implement
authentic (resp. confidential, secure) channels. Property 1 indicates that the session keys or their
associated public keys cannot be retrieved directly from an encapsulation. Different encapsulations
may use for instance the same encryption scheme. However, Property 2 prevents a part of an encap-
sulation to be mistaken as session key for another encapsulation. Properties 3 to 6 model the access
control of an encapsulation. In particular, the term tE of an encapsulation allowing reading access
can be derived from the encapsulation E and its public keys F (Property 3). On the other hand, the
term tE of an encapsulation not allowing reading access should not be derived from the encapsula-
tion without knowing the session keys XE (Property 4). Property 5 indicates that an encapsulation
allowing writing access can be deduced only if it was already sent on the network (expressed by
formula ϕ) or by generating it from its public keys F and the term tE encapsulated. Lastly, Property 6
models that an encapsulation not allowing writing access cannot be generated by an attacker unless
already given or unless some of the session keys in XE are known. In the latter, Property 6 also states
that when the term tE is not known to the attacker then he must have extracted it from encapsulations
previously received.
Most common encapsulations satisfy the requested properties.
◮ Theorem 8. The following encapsulations are:
authentic: Esign = sign(〈aEsign, x〉, x1) and Emac = 〈x, h(〈aEmac, x, x1〉)〉;
confidential: Eaenc = aenc(〈aEaenc, x〉, pk(x1));
secure: ETLS = senc(〈aETLS, x〉, x1), EBAC = 〈t,mac(〈aEBAC, t〉, x2)〉 with t = senc(〈aEBAC, x〉, x1),
and Esigncrypt = sign(〈aEsigncrypt, aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, x〉, pk(x1))〉, x2).
where aEsign, aEmac, aEaenc, aETLS, aEBAC, aEsigncrypt are constants.
Moreover, the set {(Esign, {vk(x1)}), (Emac, ∅), (Eaenc, {pk(x1)}), (ETLS, ∅), (EBAC, ∅), (Esigncrypt, ∅)}
allowsfor authentic, confidential and secure channels.
The proof of Theorem 8 is available in Appendix B. In the rest of this paper, we assume the
existence of a set of encapsulations Se allowing authentic, secure and confidential channels.
3.2 Composition of protocols
Encapsulations use session keys, which are established by a key exchange protocol. To express the
requested property of this protocol, we need to annotate it with events that specify which keys are
established for which channels and agents. Considering a context of channel and agent declarations
C and a set of channels S , we denote byC|S the contextC where all newta c with c ∈ S are removed.
We denote by TAgt the set of tuples of agents. We consider special events Ev = {ev1, ev2, . . . ∈ Ev}.
◮ Definition 9. Let P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn] be a process withC an agent and channel declaration context
such that R1, . . . ,Rn are roles of agents A1, . . . , An respectively. Let S be a set of channels such that
channels(C) ∩ S = ∅. Let ρ be a mapping from S to TAgt × Se. We say that a process P˜ is an
annotation of P under ρ if P˜ = C[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n] where for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
R′
i
= Ri.eventAi (evi(c1, ta1, ts1, tp1)). . . . .eventAi (evi(cm, tam, tsm, tpm))
where {c1, . . . , cm} = {c ∈ dom(ρ) | cρ = (ta, (E,F)) ∧ Ai ∈ st(ta)} and ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, c jρ =
(ta j, (E,F)), ts j = (u1, . . . , u|XE|), tp = F(u1, . . . , u|XE|) for some (E,F) and terms u1, . . . , u|XE| such
that if c ∈ Cha (resp. Chc, Chs) then (E,F) allows authentic (resp. confidential, secure) channels.
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At the end of each role Ri, we add the events evi for the channels c1, . . . , cm that the agent is
supposed to establish. Events evi(c, ta, ts, tp) are composed of four elements: a channel c that the
agent wants to instantiate, a tuple of agents ta indicating who is sharing the channel c, a tuple of
session keys ts that will be used in the encapsulation (E,F) to implement c, and lastly a tuple tp of
public keys associated to the session keys and F. Typically, we will require that the session keys in
ts remain secret for honest agents while the public keys are indeed public.
◮ Example 10. Continuing Example 4 and thanks to Theorem 8, the encapsulation (EBAC, ∅)
provides the passport and reader with a secure channel, denoted cs ∈ Chs, once BAC has been
executed. The fact that BAC is supposed to establish a secure channel for P and R is expressed by
the mapping ρ = {cs → ((P,R), (E, ∅))}. The corresponding annotation of BAC under ρ is as follows:
˜BAC = CBAC[RP.eventP(ev1(cs, (P,R), (f1(y, kP), f2(y, kP))))
| RR.eventR(ev2(cs, (P,R), (f1(kR,w), f2(kR,w))))]
where CBAC[_] = ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P], data[P]})._ . Note that the session keys
are different and reflect the respective views on the session keys of the passport and the reader.
◮ Definition 11. Let C and C′ be two channel and agent declaration contexts. We say that C and
C′ are composable if there exist contexts C1,C2,C
′
1
,C′
2
such that C1 and C
′
1
are sequences of agent
declarations with ba(C1) ∩ ba(C
′
1
) = ∅, C = C1[C2], C
′ = C′
1
[C′
2
] and C2,C
′
2
only differ from the
content of Kpub, Kprv in the instances of ag(A,A,Kpub,Kprv).
We define their composition, denoted CC,C
′
, as the contextC1[C
′
1
[C3]] with C3 being the context
C2 where all instances of ag(A,A,Kpub,Kprv) are replaced by ag(A,A,Kpub ∪ Kpub
′,Kprv ∪ Kprv
′)
and ag(A,A,Kpub
′,Kprv
′) is in C′
2
.
The composability of the channel and agent declaration contexts ensures that the roles of the
process Q can be sequentially composed with the roles of the process P. For instance, they should
have similar replications, agent declarations or even channel declarations. However, we do not
require that an agent in P and Q to have the same private (Kprv) or public (Kpub) data. We also allow
an agent to be declared in one context but not in the other one if declared upfront.
◮ Example 12. One of the protocols that are executed after BAC is the Passive Authentication pro-
tocol which provides an authentication mechanism proving that the content of the RFID chip is au-
thentic. In fact the ICAO standard also indicates that the chip must contain a signature by the Docu-
ment Signer authority (D) of a hash of the private data data[P], sod
de f
= sign(〈a, h(〈a, data[P]〉)〉, sk[D]).
During the Passive Authentication protocol, after receiving on the secure channel a challenge from
the reader, the passport sends back this signature that is checked by the reader.
R →sec P : read
P →sec R : 〈data, sign(〈a, h(〈a, data〉)〉, sk)
where sk is the signing key of the Document Signer authority. In our calculus, the roles of the reader
(QR) and of the passport (QP) can be described as follows:
QP = inP(cs, read).outP(cs, 〈data[P], sod〉)
QR = outR(cs, read).inR(cs, 〈x
′, sign(〈a, h(〈a, x′〉)〉, sk[D])〉)
The complete representation of the system is given by PA = CPA[new cs.(QP | QR)] where CPA is
the following context:
CPA = ag(D, {D}, {vk(sk[D])}, {sk[D]}).ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {data[P]})._
Continuing Example 10, CPA and CBAC are composable and C
CPA ,CBAC is the context:
CCPA ,CBAC = ag(D, {D}, {vk(sk[D])}, {sk[D]}).ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P], data[P]})._
Let S be a set of channels. Let ρ be a mapping from S to TAgt ×Se. We say that two processes P
and Q are composable under ρ if P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn], Q = C
′[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n] where Ri,R
′
i
are roles of the
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same agent Ai for i = 1 . . .n, C and C
′|S are composable and for all c ∈ dom(ρ), if cρ = (ta, (E,F))
then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, c ∈ chAi(Q) is equivalent to Ai ∈ ta. This reflects the fact that agents using
channel c should be explicitly listed as authorized agents for c.
The composability between P and Q ensures that the agents in Q sharing abstract authentic,
confidential and secure channels are correctly represented in ρ.
◮ Definition 13. Let S be a set of channels. Let ρ be a mapping from S to TAgt × Se. Let P =
C[R1, . . . ,Rn] and Q = C
′[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n] two closed composable processes under ρ.
For all P˜ = C[R˜1, . . . , R˜n] annotations of P under ρ, the implementation of Q by P˜ through ρ,
denoted P˜ ·ρ Q, is the process C0[R1.R
′′
1
, . . . ,Rn.R
′′
n ] where C0 = C
C,C′ |
S and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
R′′
i
is defined as R′
i
where all instances of outA(c, u) (resp. inA(c, u)) are replaced by outA(cpub,Eσ)
(resp. inA(cpub,Eσ)) when cρ = (ta, (E,F)), tEσ = u and eventA(evi(c, ta,XEσ,Fσ)) is in R˜i for
some substitution σ.
◮ Example 14. Continuing Example 12, the implementation of PA by ˜BAC through ρ is thus the
process ˜BAC ·ρ PA = CCPA ,CBAC [RP.Q
′
P
| RR.Q
′
R
] where Q′
P
and Q′
R
are defined as follows:
Q′
P
= inP(cpub,EBAC(read,K1,K2)).outP(cpub,EBAC(〈data[P], sod〉,K1,K2))
Q′
R
= outR(cpub,EBAC(read,K
′
1
,K′
2
)).inR(cpub,EBAC(〈x, sign(〈a, h(〈a, x〉)〉, sk[D])〉,K
′
1
,K′
2
))
with K1 = f1(y, kP), K2 = f2(y, kP), K
′
1
= f1(kR,w), K
′
2
= f2(kP,w). Note that the ICAO standard
describes in fact the Passive Authentication protocol as the process C[Q′
P
| Q′
R
] (without tags).
Thanks to our result, we may study the simpler process C[new cs.(QP | QR)].
4 Security property
It is easy to state secrecy in our formalism, using a special event Sec ∈ Ev: any term occurring in a
Sec event should remain secret unless the corresponding session involves a dishonest agent.
◮ Definition 15. Let Q be closed process containing contains some events of the form Sec(t, (A1,
. . . , An)) where t is a term and A1, . . . , An are some agents. Let Φ be a closed frame. We say that
Q preserves secrecy if for all (Q, ∅, ∅, ∅)
ev1·...·evm
======⇒ (Q′,Φ′, µ′, θ′), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if evi =
Sec(t′, (A′
1
, . . . , A′n)) for some t
′ and some honest agents A′
1
, . . . , A′n then Φ
′
0 t′.
We may also specify the properties requested from a key exchange protocol P: P should preserve
the secrecy of the session keys occurring in its events and should ensure that the associated public
keys are public. Moreover, P also needs to ensure that a session key cannot be used to implement
two different channels and that honest agents sharing a channel will share the same session keys for
this channel. In such a case, we say that P is a secure channel establishment protocol.
◮Definition 16. Let P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn] be a closed process. Let P˜ be an annotation of P under some
mapping ρ. We say that P˜ is a secure channel establishment protocol when for all (P˜, ∅, ∅, ∅)
e1·...·em
====⇒
(P′,Φ′, µ′, θ′), for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if ei = ev(c, ta, (s1, . . . , sℓ), (u1, . . . , uq)) such that ev ∈ Ev, all
agents in ta are honest then for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},Φ′ 0 sk and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , q},Φ
′ ⊢ uk. Moreover,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if ev j = ev
′(c′, ta′, (s′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
), (u′
1
, . . . , u′q′)) for some ev
′ ∈ Ev, some channel
c′, some tuple ta′ of agents and some tuples (s′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
) and (u′
1
, . . . , u′q′) of terms then
either ta , ta′ or c , c′ or ev = ev′ implies ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},∀k′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ′}, sk , s
′
k′
or one of the two following properties is satisfied :
(s1, . . . , sℓ) = (s
′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
) and (u1, . . . , uq) = (u
′
1
, . . . , u′q′).
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},∀k′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ′}, sk , s
′
k′
.
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The first item indicates that the session keys used for a channel between some honest agents
are necessarily different from session keys used for a different channel between any kind of agents,
whether they are honest, dishonest or a mix of both. The second item requires that for matching
channels and sets of agents, either the session keys perfectly match or they are all different.
We are now ready to state our main result: if P is a secure channel establishment protocol and if
Q preserves secrecy using some secure, confidential, or authentic channels, then Q may safely use
P to implement its channels. The proof of Theorem 17 is available in a companion report [5].
◮ Theorem 17. Let tagA and tagB be two disjoint sets of tags. Let Se be a set of tagA-encapsulation
allowing authentic, confidential, and secure channels. Let ρ be a mapping from channels to TAgt×Se.
Let P and Q be two closed executable composable tagB-processes under ρ such that P and Q do not
share names and f a(P) = f a(Q) = ∅. Let P˜ be an annotation of P under ρ. If P˜ is secure and Q
preserves secrecy then P˜ ·ρ Q preserves secrecy as well.
For simplicity, we prove secure composition w.r.t. secrecy properties but we believe that our
result could be easily extended to trace properties.
Sketch of proof. The proof first relies on that fact that the reachability properties are preserved by
disjoint parallel composition. In particular, the process P˜ | Q is a secure channel establishment pro-
tocol and preserves secrecy. The rest of the proof consists in showing that any trace of P˜ ·ρ Q is also
a trace of P˜ | Q with a frame that induces a similar attacker knowledge. More specifically, properties
from Definition 7 ensure that tagB-terms generated by the attacker or obtained from the encapsu-
lations in P˜ ·ρ Q do not give any relevant knowledge to the attacker and can be replaced by fresh
names. This allows us to obtain a trace without tagB-terms and so without encapsulations. Lastly,
since P˜ | Q is a secure channel establishment protocol, we can always match two encapsulations
having same session keys with the corresponding abstract channel in P˜ | Q. ◭
◮ Example 18. Continuing Example 14, the annotation under ρ of the Basic Access Control ˜BAC
is secure and the Passive Authentication CPA[new cs.(QP.eventP(Sec(data[P], (P,R))) | QR)] pre-
serves secrecy (of the private data). Hence, thanks to Theorems 8 and 17, the implementation of PA
by ˜BAC through ρ, CCPA ,CBAC [RP.Q
′
P
.eventP(Sec(data[P], (P,R))) | RR.Q
′
R
], preserves secrecy.
5 Case studies
We show that our approach can be applied to deployed protocols such as the biometric passport
or TLS applied to 3D-secure. As an application, we show that the automatic analysis through the
CL-Atse tool can be significantly speed up when the number of sessions goes higher.
5.1 Biometric passport
Our running example is the combination of the Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol with the Pass-
ive Authentication (PA) protocol from the electronic passports. Actually, PA is not the only protocol
executed after BAC. Another authentication mechanism is used to prevent cloning of the passport
chip. This protocol, called Active Authentication protocol (AA), also uses the same session keys
and encapsulations than PA. Using the CL-Atse tool [18], we show for different scenarios that BAC
is a secure channel establishment protocol and that PA and AA both preserve secrecy. Thanks to
our main result, this yields security of the combined protocol, where BAC implements the secure
channel of PA and AA. For comparaison purpose, we also analyze directly the combined protocol
with CL-Atse. These analysis are reported in Section 5.3
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5.2 TLS and 3D-secure
Our results also apply to other complex systems. We study the Visa 3D-secure protocol [17] used
by several websites for internet banking and that relies on secure channels implemented by the well
known TLS protocol. The Visa 3D secure protocol is an authenticated payment method between
a card holder and a merchant during an electronic payment. This protocol aims to ensure authen-
tication of the card holder as well as confirmation that the card holder is authorized by his bank to
make the payment. Lastly, the protocol also aims to ensure the secrecy of the card holder’s banking
information, the payment amount and other data.
The protocol involves four types of participants: a card holder (C), a merchant (M), a central-
ized structure called Visa Directory Servers (DS) and the card issuer’s servers called Access Control
Servers (ACS). The main role of the Visa Directory Servers is to transfer card holder’s information
between the Access Control Servers and the merchant. In itself, the 3D secure protocol is already
a complex protocol with multiple exchanges of messages. But the protocol also requires most mes-
sages to be exchanged trough a TLS channel. More specifically, messages of the 3D secure protocol
shall be encrypted with a symmetric session key previously established with TLS. In our model, this
means that the messages are encapsulated by (ETLS, ∅), as defined in Theorem 8.
The well known TLS protocol [15, 9] aims at establishing a secure channel between a client and
a server. Using the CL-Atse tool, we show that TLS (Basic TLS handshake, in the RSA mode) is
indeed a secure channel establishment protocol.
Note that for one session of the Visa 3D secure protocol yields four sessions of the TLS protocol:
one channel between C and M, between C and ACS, between ACS and DS and finally between M
and DS. This renders the verification of even one session of 3D secure protocol with the channels
implemented by TLS a complex task (more than thirty five messages exchanged per session).
5.3 Analysis with CL-Atse
We applied the automatic verification tool CL-Atse [18] on a Dell T1700 computer (16 Go RAM,
3.40 GHz CPU). The corresponding time of analysis are displayed below.
Computation time (in seconds, timeout set to 24 hours)
protocols TLS & 3D secure BAC & PA BAC & AA BAC & PA & AA
complete system (C) or
separated analysis (S)
S C S C S C S C
number of 1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.2
sessions 2 1350 time out 6.2 1.6 6.2 1.6 6.5 43156
considered 3 time out time out 9133 time out 9133 time out 9185 time out
Amongst the tools able to verify security protocols for a bounded number of sessions, CL-Atse is
well known and considered to be one of the fastest. However, in the case of the 3D-secure protocol,
the tool already fails to verify one session with all channels implemented as we reached a time out
set to 24 hours of computation. Thus, to obtain meaningful results with the 3D-secure protocol,
we considered the case where only the channel between the card holder and the merchant is imple-
mented. Already in this case, we can see a clear benefit from analyzing separately 3D-secure and
TLS when considering two sessions. Indeed, the verification can be performed under 25 minutes
when analysing the protocols separately whereas the tool was reaching a time out when considering
the complete system. We obtain similar results with the Basic Access Control protocol, the Active
Authentication protocol and the Passive Authentication protocol. Note that for verification tools
handling unbounded number of sessions (e.g. ProVerif [3], Tamarin [14]), the gain in time would
probably be less significant since these tools do not systematically explore all interleavings.
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6 Conclusion
We have shown how to securely compose a protocol with the implementation of its channels. We
have provided a characterization for the three most common types of channels: secure, confidential,
and authentic channels. We plan to consider other types of communication channels like anonymous
channels. This will certainly require to extend our approach to equivalence properties.
Our composition result holds for a class of primitives that encompasses all standard crypto-
graphic primitives. We plan to extend it to a larger class of primitives, including in particular exclus-
ive or or homomorphic encryption.
Our result assumes a light tagging of the primitives, to ensure that an encapsulation cannot be
confusedwith a message coming from the protocols. While tagging is reasonable, it is not often done
in practice. On the other hand standard protocols typically enjoy some non unifiability properties
that prevent such confusion. We believe that our result could be extended to a general notion of non
unifiability of the terms, without having to require explicit tagging.
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A Modelization of other protocols
A.1 TLS and 3D secure
A.1.1 TLS
TLS is the protocol that is most often used when an application needs a secure channel to com-
municate on a public network. In a TLS session between a client C and a server S , C and S start
by doing a handshake : C sends a message containing a constant helloC along with his name, a
session number id and a fresh nonce nC . The server then answers a constant helloS along with the
same session number id, another fresh nonce nS and its signed public encryption key. After that,
C runs the key exchange step by encrypting with S ’s public key a message containing a randomly
generated value pms along with the two previous nonces nC and nS , S checks that nC and nS are in
the message he received and if so C and S build the session key keygen(pms, nS , nC). The two last
steps consist in C and S sending each other respectively the hashes f inishC and f inishS encryp-
ted by keygen(pms, nS , nC) : they contain all the values that were transmitted during the session,
furthermore f inishC and f inishS contain respectively the labels client and server so that they can
not be confused. f inishC and f inishS enable C and S to check that they agree upon what has been
transmitted during the session. The session key keygen(pms, nS , nC) provided by TLS will be used
to implement the channels in other protocols
Here is diagram showing how a TLS session works with tTLS a tag:
C → S : 〈helloC, name[C], nC, id〉
S → C : 〈helloS, nS , id〉
S → C : sign(〈tTLS, name[S ], pk(priv[S ])〉, sk[S ])
C → S : aenc(〈tTLS, pms〉, pk(priv[S ]))
C → S : senc(〈tTLS, f inishC〉, keygen(pms, nC, nS ))
with f inishC = h(〈tTLS, keygen(pms, nC, nS ), name[C], name[S ], nC, nS , id, client〉)
S → C : senc(〈tTLS, f inishS 〉, keygen(pms, nC, nS ))
with f inishS = h(〈tTLS, keygen(pms, nC, nS ), name[C], name[S ], nC, nS , id, server〉)
In our models, the roles of the client (RC) and of the server (RS) are as follows, with c ∈ Chp :
RC = new nC .new id.outC(c, 〈helloC, name[C], nC, id〉).inC(c, 〈helloS, x, id〉).
inC(c, sign(〈tTLS, name[S ], u〉, sk[S ])).new pms.outC(c, aenc(〈tTLS, pms〉, u)).
outC(c, senc(〈tTLS, f inishC1〉, keygen(pms, nC, x))).
inC(c, senc(〈tTLS, f inishS 1〉, keygen(pms, nC, x))).0
RS = inS(c, 〈helloC, v,w, y〉).new nS .outS(c, 〈helloS, nS , y〉).
outS(c, sign(〈tTLS, name[S ], pk(priv[S ])〉, sk[S ])).
inS(c, aenc(〈tTLS, z〉, pk(priv[S ]))).inS(c, senc(〈tTLS, f inishC2〉, keygen(z,w, nS ))).
outS(c, senc(〈tTLS, f inishS 2〉, keygen(z,w, nS ))).0
where
f inishC1 = h(〈keygen(pms, nC, x), name[C], name[S ], nC, x, Id, client〉)
f inishS 1 = h(〈keygen(pms, nC, x), name[C], name[S ], nC, x, Id, server〉)
f inishC2 = h(〈keygen(z,w, nS ), v, name[C], name[S ],w, nS , y, client〉)
f inishS 2 = h(〈keygen(z,w, nS ), v, name[C], name[S ],w, nS , y, server〉)
The session key provided by TLS is keygen(z,w, nS ) for RS and keygen(pms, nC, x) for RC.
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A.1.2 3D secure
An informal description of a 3D-secure session between a client C, a merchant M, a directory server
DS and an access control server ACS is provided below.
C →sec M : 〈pan[C], expiry[C]〉
M →sec DS : 〈pan[C], password[M], in f oM〉
DS →sec ACS : 〈pan[C], in f oM〉
ACS →sec DS : 〈panok, acctid, url[ACS ], proto〉
DS →sec M : 〈panok, acctid, url[ACS ], proto〉
M →sec C : sign(〈t3D, in f oM, publicM, expiry[C], transIn f o〉, skVIS A[M])
C →sec ACS : sign(〈t3D, in f oM, publicM, expiry[C], transIn f o〉, skVIS A[M])
ACS →sec C : 〈name[M], payIn f o, panshort[C], expiry[C]〉
ACS →outo f band C : pam[C]
C →sec ACS : password[C]
ACS →sec C : sign(〈t3D, in f oM, xid, payIn f o, panshort[C], status, otherIn f o〉, skVIS A[ACS ])
C →sec M : sign(〈t3D, in f oM, xid, payIn f o, panshort[C], status, otherIn f o〉, skVIS A[ACS ])
M →sec C : sign(〈t3D, status〉, skVIS A[M])
where in f oM = 〈macqbin, id[M]〉, publicM = 〈name[M], url[M]〉, transIn f o = 〈xid, pdate, pamnt,
acctid〉, payIn f o = 〈pamnt, pdate〉 and otherIn f o = 〈date, cavv, eci, cavvalg〉. The specification of
the 3D-secure protocol is not public, the semantics of some of the data (e.g. cavv, eci, cavvalg) are
unspecified even in [17]. That is why in the protocol we model them as nonces.
A 3D-secure session starts whenC sends toM a purchase request containing her primary account
number pan[C] and the expiration date expiry[C] of the card. Then M forwards to DS pan[C] along
with M’s identifiers in f oM and password[M] shared only by M and DS : M asks for confirmation
about C’s banking account. DS transmits to ACS the identifiers of M along with pan[C] so that
ACS certifies the existence of the bank account of C. Upon successful verification, ACS sends con-
firmation panok to DS along with its own url url[ACS ] and some other information to be forwarded
to M. M then sends to C a signed copy of M’s own information in f oM and publicM along with
the identifiers transIn f o regarding the transaction, furthermore it makesC initiate a communication
with ACS thanks to his knowledge of url[ACS ]. C forwards M’s signed message to ACS so that
ACS checks C. ACS sends back to C a summary of the transaction (M’s identity, payIn f o and
panshort[C]). ACS also sends a personnal assurance message pam[C] at some point that C uses to
determine the password password[C] that she has to give to authentify herself to ACS . The nature
of pam[C] is not specified, usually it consists in a secret code sent toC’s mobile phone that has to be
sent back, or it can be a password matrix given to C when she gets her credit card, in that case C just
has to send the password contained in a case specified by ACS . In the end, ACS gives C a signed
message containing all the data necessary to conclude the transaction. That certified message is then
forwarded to M and finally M signs with his own signing key the status of the transaction between
C and M.
We notice that the signing key sk involved in TLS is different from the ones involved in 3D
secure, which models the fact that signing keys in 3D secure are provided by VISA that is in charge
of credit cards, thus that signing key has no reason to be involved in TLS. Consequently TLS and
3D secure do not share names, which is a prerequisite of our result.
A.1.3 Composition between TLS and 3D secure
Channels in 3D secure have to be implemented between all the users that have to speak together,
namely C and M, M and DS , DS and ACS , ACS and C. Thus if 3D secure is to be composed with
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TLS, we need to instanciate it with all the agents that will later share secure channels in 3D secure.
However given that the CL-Atse tool can not analyse 4 TLS sessions within a reasonable time (24
hours), we had to restrict the composition to only one channel implementation between C and M.
Consequently we model the case where there is only one honest Access Directory Server ACS , one
honest Directory Server DS and one honest merchant M speaking with an unbounded number of
clients, possibly dishonest. The four roles of 3D-secure are denoted by R′
C
, R′
M
, R′
DS
, and R′
ACS
. Thus
3D secure can be modeled by the following process:
3D = C3D[new c
ca1
s .new c
ca2
s .new c
cm
s .new c
ma
s .new c
ad
s .(R
′
C | R
′
M | R
′
ACS | R
′
DS )]
where
C3D[_] = ag(M, {M},K
′M
pub,K
′M
prv).ag(ACS , {ACS }, ∅,K
′ACS
prv ).ag(DS , {DS }, ∅, ∅).!ag(C,P, ∅,K
′C
prv)._
with the setsK
′M
pub
= {id[M], name[M]},K
′M
prv = {password[M], skVIS A[M], url[M]},K
′C
prv = {pan[C],
expiry[C], pam[C], password[C]} andK
′ACS
prv = {skVIS A[ACS ], url[ACS ]}.
Since we implement only the secure channel between C and M, the complete representation
of the system is the process TLS = ag(M, {M},KM
pub
,KMprv).!ag(C,P,K
C
pub
, ∅).(RC | RS) where P
is an infinite set of agents containing honest and dishonest agents such that M < P and KM
pub
=
{pk(priv[M]), vk(sk[M]), name[M]},KMprv = {priv[M], sk[M]}, K
C
pub
= {name[C]}.
As previously mentioned, the 3D-secure protocol specifies that all the exchanged messages
should be done on secure channels implemented by TLS, except the out of bound channel used
by the issuer’s Access Control Servers. More specifically, they require that all messages of the 3D
secure protocol must be encrypted with a symmetric session key previously established with TLS.
In our model, it means that the messages are encapsulated by (ETLS, ∅), as defined in Theorem 8.
Moreover as explained in Section 5, the session keys provided by TLS are keygen(z,w, nS ) and
keygen(pms, nC, x) for the card holder and merchant respectively. Therefore, by defining the map-
ping ρ = {ccm
S
→ ((C,M), (ETLS, ∅))}, an annotation of TLS under ρ is the following process:
˜TLS = CTLS [RC.eventC(ev(c
cm
s , (C,M), k
1
CM
)) | RS.eventM(ev(c
cm
s , (C,M), k
2
CM
))]
where CTLS [_] = ag(M, {M},K
M
pub
,KMprv).ag(C,P,K
C
pub
, ∅)._, k1
CM
= keygen(pms, nC, x)) and k
2
CM
=
keygen(z,w, nS )). Therefore, the implementation of 3D by ˜TLS through ρ is the process:
˜TLS ·ρ 3D = CCTLS ,C3D[(new c
ca1
S
.new c
ca2
S
.new cmaS .new c
ad
S .(RC.R
′
C) | (RS.R
′
M) | R
′
ACS | R
′
DS )]
where
CCTLS ,C3D [_] = ag(M, {M},KM
pub
∪ K
′M
pub
,KMprv ∪ K
′M
prv).ag(ACS , {ACS },K
′ACS
pub
,K
′ACS
prv ).
ag(DS , {DS }, ∅, ∅).!ag(C,P,KC
pub
,KCprv ∪ K
′C
prv)._
Our result now enables us to conclude that if
C3D[(new c
ca1
S
.new c
ca2
S
.new ccm
S
.new cma
S
.new cad
S
.
(R′
C
.eventC(Sec(pan[C], (C,M, ACS ,DS ))) | R
′
M
| R′
ACS
| R′
DS
))]
preserves secrecy (in that instance, the secrecy of pan[C]) and if ˜TLS is secure, then the implement-
ation of the process 3D by ˜TLS through ρ preserves secrecy. Furthermore we can also look at the
secrecy of other data such as pam[C] expressed as follows.
C3D[(new c
ca1
S
.new c
ca2
S
.new ccm
S
.new cma
S
.new cad
S
.
(R′
C
.eventC(Sec(pam[C], (C, ACS ))) | R
′
M
| R′
ACS
| R′
DS
))]
Note that the secrecy of pam[C] only concerns the agentsC and ACS whereas the secrecy of pan[C]
is between C, M, ACS , DS . Our model allows us to verify the secrecy of pam[C] even when M or
DS can be dishonest.
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A.2 Active Authentication protocol
The aim of the Active Authentication protocol (AA) is to prevent cloning of the passport chip. For
that purpose the protocol relies on a signing key sk[P] that is registered in a tempered resistant
memory and cannot be read or copied. A certificate of the verification key vk(sk[P]) provided by
the Document Signer authority mentioned in Example 12 is in fact contained in the data of the
passport. For sake of simplicity, we represented these data in Example 12 as a name data[P] since
their exact value was irrelevant for the implementation of the Passive Authentication protocol by the
Basic Access Control protocol. In reality, the data stored in the chip is organized in data groups
(dg1 up to dg19), some of them containing the passport holder’s name, picture, etc. In particular,
the certificate of the verification key vk(sk[P]), that is sign(vk(sk[P]), sk[D]), is stored in the data
group dg15. Thus, by replacing, in the Passive Authentication presented in Example 12, the name
data[P] by the tuple of data groups, we can see that a reader would then be able to obtain from d15
the verification key vk(sk[P]) after the execution of the protocol.
A session of the Active Authentication protocol is as follows: R sends to P a nonce nR that P has
to send back along with a nonce nP after having them signed with sk[P]. In our study we consider
the case where AA is a-tagged, although it is not the case in practice.
R →sec P : 〈init, nR〉
P →sec R : sign(〈a, nP, nR〉, sk[P])
The AA roles of the reader (QR) and of the passport (QP) on cs ∈ Chs can be expressed as below in
our formalism :
QR = new nR.outR(cs, 〈init, nR〉).inR(cs, sign(〈a, x
′, nR〉, sk[P]))
QP = inP(cs, 〈init, y
′〉).new nP.outP(cs, sign(〈a, nP, y
′〉, sk[P]))
We model the case where one honnest reader speaks with an unbounded number of honest and
dishonest passports. Thus AA can be modeled as a whole by AA = CAA[new cs.(QR | QP)] where
CAA = ag(D, {D}, vk(sk[D]), sk[D]).ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {sk[P]})._
where P is an infinite set of agents containing honest and dishonest agents and R,D < P.
We study the composition between the Basic Access Control (BAC) and AA. As explained
in the section 2.3, in the a-tagged BAC protocol the role of the passport (RP) and the role of
the reader (RR) can be modeled as shown below, with c ∈ Chp, M = senc(〈a, x, nP, y〉, ke[P]),
N = senc(〈a, nP, x, kP〉, ke[P]), U = senc(〈a, nR, z, kR〉, ke[P]) and V = senc(〈a, z, nR,w〉, ke[P]) :
RP = inP(c, challenge).new nP.outP(c, nP).inP(c, 〈M,mac(〈a,M〉, km[P])〉).
new kP.outP(c, 〈N,mac(〈a,N〉, km[P])〉).0
RR = outR(c, challenge).inR(c, z).new kR.new nR.outR(c, 〈U,mac(〈a,U〉, km[P])).
inR(c, 〈V,mac(〈a,V〉, km[P])〉).0
Hence an honest reader communicating with an unbounded number of passports that are either hon-
est or dishonest can be modeled by :
BAC = ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P]}).(RP | RR)
As written in section 3.1, the BAC protocol is meant to generate two session keys per role
(f1(y, kP) and f2(y, kP) for RP, f1(kR,w) and f2(kR,w) for RR), and the messages sent in AA are all en-
capsulated by (EBAC, ∅) whereEBAC = 〈t,mac(〈aEBAC, t〉, x2)〉with t = senc(〈aEBAC, x〉, x1), tEBAC = x
and XEBAC = (x1, x2). By theorem 8, the encapsulation (EBAC, ∅) implements secure channels.
Vincent Cheval, Véronique Cortier, and Eric le Morvan 19
The fact that BAC aims at establishing a secure channel for P and R is translated in our model
by using the mapping ρ = {cs → ((P,R), (EBAC, ∅))} and the associated annotation of BAC under ρ:
˜BAC = CBAC[RP.eventP(ev(cs, (P,R), (f1(y, kP), f2(y, kP))))
| RR.eventR(ev(cs, (P,R), (f1(kR,w), f2(kR,w))))]
where CBAC[_] = ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P]})._ .
Hence the two contexts CBAC and CAA can be composed into the new context
CCAA ,CBAC = ag(D, {D}, vk(sk[D]), sk[D]).ag(R, {R}, ∅, ∅).!ag(P,P, ∅, {ke[P], km[P], sk[P]})._
And now we can write the process ˜BAC ·ρ PA = CCAA ,CBAC [RP.Q
′
P
| RR.Q
′
R
] where Q′
P
and Q′
R
are
defined as follows:
Q′
P
= inP(cpub,EBAC(〈init, y
′〉,K1,K2)).
new nP.outP(cpub,EBAC(sign(〈a, nP, y
′〉, sk[P]),K1,K2))
Q′
R
= new nR.outR(cpub,EBAC(〈init, nR〉,K
′
1
,K′
2
)).
inR(cpub,EBAC(sign(〈a, x
′, nP〉, sk[P]),K
′
1
,K′
2
))
with K1 = f1(y, kP), K2 = f2(y, kP), K
′
1
= f1(kR,w), K
′
2
= f2(kP,w).
Our result enables us for instance to conclude that if the annotation under ρ of the Basic Access
Control ˜BAC is secure and if the Active Authentication
CAA[new cs.(QR | QP.eventP(Sec(sk[P], (P))))]
preserves secrecy, then
CCAA ,CBAC [RP.Q
′
P.eventP(Sec(sk[P], (P))) | RR.Q
′
R]
also preserves secrecy.
B Secure encapsulations
For our proofs, we will need to discuss about the deduction proof of Φ ⊢ t. As such, we will denote
by Φ ⊢P t the deduction of Φ ⊢ t with an associated proof P. We write Φ ⊢i t when t is the i-th
element of Φ. We write Φ ⊢t t when t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst. When an inference rule ir is applied on premises
Φ ⊢P1 u1, . . . ,Φ ⊢Pn un to obtain the term u, we write Φ ⊢ir(P1,...,Pn) u. Note that given a proof P and a
frame Φ, there exists a unique t such that Φ ⊢P t.
Given as a proof P can be seen as a term, we write M(P) = (n,m) the pair of integer where
n = max{i ∈ st(P) ∩N} if st(P) ∩N , ∅ else n = 0; and m = |P| where |P| is the number of symbols
in P. We also consider the lexicographic order on pairs of integers. Given Φ and t, we say that a
proof P of Φ ⊢ t is minimal for M if for all P′, Φ ⊢P′ t impliesM(P) ≤ M(P
′). We also consider
sometimes minimal proof P for |P| instead ofM(P).
Lastly we say that a proof P is a successive sequence of applications of decomposition rule on
the i-th element of Φ when there exists n ∈ N such that P = irn(. . . ir1(i, P1, . . . , Pm) . . . , P
′
1
, . . . , P′m′)
and each irk is a decomposition rule for k = 1 . . .n.
We denote by st<(t) the set of strict subterms of t. We naturally extend this notion to frames.
◮ Lemma 19. Let Φ be a frame. Let t ∈ T (F ,N ∪X) such that Φ ⊢ t. For all P minimal proofs for
|P| of Φ ⊢ t, for all P′ ∈ st(P), for all terms t′, if Φ ⊢P′ t
′ then
root(t′) < Fkey and root(P) is a composition rule imply t
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(t);
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root(t′) < Fkey and root(P) is a decomposition rule imply t
′ ∈ st(Φ);
t′ = f(u) for some term u and f ∈ Fkey implies u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(t).
Proof. We show the result by induction onM(P).
Base case |P| = 1: In such a case, t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ. In the former, root(t) < Fkey and root(P)
is neither a composition rule nor a decomposition rule. Hence the result directly holds. In the latter,
t ∈ Φ and root(P) is neither a composition rule nor a decomposition rule. Therefore, if t = f(u) for
some term u and f ∈ Fkey then we directly have that u ∈ st<(Φ). Hence the result holds.
Induction case |P| > 1: Otherwise root(P) is an inference rule. Therefore, we have :
t1 . . . tn
t
with P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn) and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢Pk tk. Applying the inductive hypothesis we
can deduce that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all P′ ∈ st(Pk), for all t
′, if Φ ⊢P′ t
′ then :
root(t′) < Fkey and root(Pk) is a composition rule imply t
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(tk);
root(t′) < Fkey and root(Pk) is a decomposition rule imply t
′ ∈ st(Φ);
t′ = f(u) for some term u and f ∈ Fkey implies u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(tk).
Let P′ ∈ st(P) and let t′ be a term such that Φ ⊢P′ t
′. Let us do a case analysis on whether ir is a
decomposition or a composition rule.
Case ir is a composition rule: In such a case, there exists a function symbol f such that t =
f(t1, . . . , tn), implying that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, st(Φ)∪ st(tk) ⊆ st(Φ)∪ st(t) and st<(Φ)∪ st<(tk) ⊆
st<(Φ) ∪ st<(t). Hence, if P
′ ∈ st(Pk) for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n} the result directly holds given our
inductive hypothesis. Consider now P′ = P and so t′ = t. In such a case, if root(t) < Fkey then we
directly have that t ∈ st(t) else t = f(u) with f ∈ Fkey and u ∈ st<(t). Therefore the result holds.
Case ir is a decomposition rule: Otherwise t1 = f(t, u1, . . . , um) for some term u1, . . . , um and f <
Fkey. Since P is minimal, we deduce that either root(P1) is a decomposition rule or P = t1
meaning that t1 ∈ Φ (otherwise there would exist P
′
1
∈ st(P1) such that Φ ⊢P′
1
t and |P′
1
| <
|P|). Let us first focus on P′ ∈ st(P1). If root(t
′) < Fkey then by our inductive hypothesis
and knowing that ir is a decomposition rule, we obtain that t′ ∈ st(Φ). In particular when
P′ = P1 we deduce that f(t, u1, . . . , um) ∈ st(Φ). Moreover, if t
′ = g(u) with g ∈ Fkey then
u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)). Since f(t, u1, . . . , um) ∈ st(Φ), u ∈ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)) implies
u ∈ st<(Φ). Hence the result holds.
Note that f(t, u1, . . . , um) ∈ st(Φ) allows us to directly prove that t ∈ st(Φ) hence the result holds
in the case P′ = P and t′ = t.
Let us now focus on the case where P′ ∈ st(Pk) for some k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. By our inductive
hypothesis, we know that root(t′) < Fkey implies t
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(tk). But from the definition
of a decomposition rule, we know that for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, either tk ∈ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)) or
root(tk) ∈ Fkey and st<(tk) ⊆ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)). In the former, since f(t, u1, . . . , um) ∈ st(Φ) then
we directly deduce that t′ ∈ st(Φ). In the latter, since root(t′) < Fkey and root(tk) ∈ Fkey then
t′ ∈ st(tk) implies t
′ ∈ st<(tk) and so t
′ ∈ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)) ⊆ st(Φ).
If t′ = g(u) with g ∈ Fkey then by our inductive hypothesis, u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(tk). But we have
already shown that st<(tk) ⊆ st<(f(t, u1, . . . , um)) and f(t, u1, . . . , um) ∈ st(Φ). Hence we deduce
that u ∈ st<(tk) implies that u ∈ st<(Φ) which allows us to conclude.
◭
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B.1 BAC encapsulation
◮ Lemma 20. Let aEBAC ∈ Tag. Let EBAC = 〈t, h(〈aEBAC, 〈t, z〉〉)〉 with t = senc(〈a, x〉, y), tEBAC = x
and XEBAC = (y, z). We have that (EBAC, ∅) is a {aEBAC}-tagged encapsulation and S = {(EBAC, ∅)}
allows secure channels.
Proof. Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. Since S =
{(EBAC, ∅)}, we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote tEi = xi
and XEi = (yi, zi). Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be
a ground frame such that aEBAC < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}. We
show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Properties 1, 2, 4 and 6 of Definition 7 hold.
Property 1: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ, ziσ}) such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t. Assume that
P is minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ or
t = Ekσ for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEBAC < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ.
Therefore, Φ ⊢ t and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exist j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that
P′ = |Φ| + j. Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exist ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that
P′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈ st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By
Lemma 19, we deduce that either t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and
u ∈ st<(Φ)∪st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪st<(t). Since aEBAC < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En are
equal after variable renaming, we deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule. Since
ir is a decomposition rule, we in fact have P′′ = ir(P′) where ir is one of the pair decomposition.
Moreover, either t′′ = h(〈aEBAC, 〈u, ziσ〉〉) where u = senc(〈aEBAC, xiσ〉, yiσ) or t
′′ = u. Once again
since aEBAC < st(t), we deduce that P
′′
, P. Thus, there exists Q = ir′(Q1, . . . ,Qℓ) and ℓ
′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}
such that Q ∈ st(P) and Qℓ′ = P
′′.
By the Lemma 19, we can easily show that ir′ cannot be a composition rule for some g < Fkey
since if would imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q Erσ for some r which would contradict our hypothesis on
the minimality of |P|. We also show that ir′ cannot be is a composition rule for some g ∈ Fkey. In
such a case, it would imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q g(t
′′). But since aEBAC ∈ st(t
′′), then Q , P and so
there must be another inference rule ir′′ applied on Q in P. Once again, by Lemma 19, ir′′ cannot be a
composition rule for any function symbol since it would imply that g(t′′) ∈ st(Φ)∪st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
)∪st(t)
but EBAC does not contain function symbol from Fkey and aEBAC < st(t, σ,Φ). Moreover, ir
′′ cannot
be a decomposition rule either since the only rule involving a function symbol g ∈ Fkey as argument
is the signature decomposition which would imply that there exists a term v and a proof R ∈ st(P)
such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R sign(v, t
′′). Once again, this is prevented by Lemma 19. Therefore, we can
conclude that ir′ cannot be a composition rule for some g ∈ Fkey.
Thus, ir′ is a decomposition rule. Note that once again thanks to Lemma 19 and the fact that
aEBAC < st(t, σ,Φ), we can deduce that j
′ = 1 meaning that t′′ is not used as a key in the decomposi-
tion rule ir′. But there is no decomposition rule for h, thus t′′ = senc(〈a, x jσ〉, y jσ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q2
y jσ. This allows us to deduce that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q 〈aEBAC, x jσ〉. But Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ 〈aEBAC, x jσ〉
also imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ x jσ and so j ∈ I. Therefore,Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ 〈aEBAC, x jσ〉.
We have just shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there
exists a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j and a term u such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
u and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j
u. Therefore, by replacing all instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei)rX and v ∈ st(E j)rX such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉.
By definition of EBAC, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of EBAC such that u = Ei|p
and v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
22 Secure refinements of communication channels
Property 4: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consider a minimal proof P for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P xiσ.
We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ or xiσ = Ekσ for
some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEBAC < st(xiσ). Hence, we deduce that xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ.
Therefore,Φ ⊢ xiσ and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ xiσ.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Following exactly the proof of Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ), we deduce
that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ|+ j then there exists a prefix p
′
j
of p j, a
proof Q j such that P|p′
j
= ir1(ir2(|Φ|+ j),Q j), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
〈aEBAC, x jσ〉 andΦ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q j y jσ
where ir1 is the decomposition rule of senc and ir2 is the first decomposition rule of 〈 〉. Let us look at
the proof Q j. Since aEBAC < st(y jσ), we can deduce by minimality of |P| that |Φ|+ j < Q j (otherwise,
using the same reasoning, it would imply that there exists a proof Q′
j
∈ st<(Q j) deducing yiσ). Thus,
Φ ·[Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢Q j y jσ. Let I
′ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n}− j | Φ ·[Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢ xiσ}. Note that I
′ ⊆ I− j.
By applying Property 1 on y jσ with [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j and I
′, we deduce that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I′ ⊢ y jσ.
Therefore, we have proven that if |Φ| + i ∈ st(P) then Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ y jσ. Otherwise, if for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, P|p j = |Φ| + j implies that i , j then we also have proven that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ x jσ using the same replacement of proofs as in the proof of Property 1. Hence, the
result holds.
Property 6: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ some ground substitution such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′
and aEBAC < st(σ
′), if we denote J = I − i then. Consider a proof P minimal for |P| such that
Φ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1 due to the fact that aEBAC < st(Φ).
Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we already know that Ei ∼ Ek then
the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
Case ir is a decomposition rule: By Lemma 19, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
).
But since aEBAC < st(Φ) ∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the
minimality of |P|.
Case ir is a composition rule: In such a case, we have P = ir(P1, P2) and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P1 u and
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P2 h(〈aEBAC, 〈u, ziσ
′〉) with u = senc(〈aEBAC, xiσ
′〉, yiσ
′). Let us first focus on P2.
If the last rule of P2 starts by a decomposition rule, then by Lemma 19, we deduce that h(〈aEBAC,
〈u, ziσ
′〉) ∈ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
) which would then imply that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
h(〈aEBAC, 〈u, ziσ
′〉) = h(〈aEBAC, 〈v, zkσ〉) with v = senc(〈aEBAC, xkσ〉, ykσ). Therefore, xkσ =
xiσ
′ and so Eiσ
′ = Ekσ which contradicts our hypothesis on the minimality of |P|. Therefore,
the last rule of P2 is necessarily a composition rule, implying that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ ziσ
′. Following
the same proof of Property 1 (replacing t by ziσ
′), we deduce that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ ziσ
′.
Let us now consider P1. If P1 starts by a decomposition rule, then by Lemma 19, we deduce that
senc(〈aEBAC, xiσ
′〉, yiσ
′) ∈ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
). Thus, it implies that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that xiσ
′ = x jσ and yiσ
′ = y jσ meaning that XEiσ
′ ∩ XE jσ , ∅. Hence the result holds. If on
the other hand, P1 starts by a composition rule then we directly have that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ
′.
Once again by following the same proof as in Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ
′), we deduce that
Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ xiσ
′.
◭
B.2 TLS encapsulation
◮ Lemma 21. Let aETLS ∈ Tag. Let ETLS = senc(〈aETLS, x〉, y), tETLS = x and XETLS = y. We have
that (ETLS, ∅) is a {aETLS}-tagged encapsulation and S = {(ETLS, ∅)} allows secure channels.
Proof. Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. Since S =
{(ETLS, ∅)}, we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote tEi = xi
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and XEi = yi. Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be a
ground frame such that aETLS < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}. We
show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Properties 1, 2, 4 and 6 of Definition 7 hold.
Property 1: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ}) such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t. Assume that P is
minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪Fcst or t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ
for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aETLS < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ. Therefore,
Φ ⊢ t and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that
P′ = |Φ| + j. Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exists ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such
that P′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈ st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By
Lemma 19, we deduce that either t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and
u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t). Since aETLS < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En
are equal after variable renaming, we deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule.
Since ir is a decomposition rule, we in fact have P′′ = ir(P′,Q) where ir is the senc decomposition
and t′′ = 〈aETLS, x jσ〉. Thus we have that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ x jσ and so j ∈ I. Therefore,Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢
〈aETLS, x jσ〉.
We have just shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there
exists a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j and a term u such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
u and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j
u. Therefore, by replacing all instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei)rX and v ∈ st(E j)rX such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉.
By definition of ETLS, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of ETLS such that u = Ei|p
and v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 4: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consider a minimal proof P for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P xiσ.
We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ or xiσ = Ekσ for
some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aETLS < st(xiσ). Hence, we deduce that xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ.
Therefore, Φ ⊢ xiσ and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ xiσ.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Following exactly the proof of Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ), we deduce
that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there exists a prefix p
′
j
of p j,
a proof Q j such that P|p′
j
= ir(|Φ| + j,Q j), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
〈aETLS, x jσ〉 and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q j y jσ
where ir is the decomposition rule of senc. Let us look at the proof Q j. Since aETLS < st(y jσ), we
can deduce by minimality of |P| that |Φ| + j < Q j (otherwise, using the same reasoning, it would
imply that there exists a proof Q′
j
∈ st<(Q j) deducing yiσ). Thus, Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢Q j y jσ. Let
I′ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} − j | Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢ xiσ}. Note that I
′ ⊆ I − j. By applying Property 1 on
y jσ with [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j and I
′, we deduce that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I′ ⊢ y jσ.
Therefore, we have proven that if |Φ| + i ∈ st(P) then Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ yiσ. Otherwise, if for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, P|p j = |Φ| + j implies that i , j then we also have proven that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ x jσ using the same replacement of proofs as in the proof of Property 1. Hence, the
result holds.
Property 6: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ be some ground substitution such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′.
Consider a proof P minimal for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that
Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1 due to the fact that aETLS < st(Φ). Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we already know that Ei ∼ Ek then the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
Case ir is a decomposition rule: by Lemma 19, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
).
But since aETLS < st(Φ) ∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the
minimality of |P|.
24 Secure refinements of communication channels
Case ir is a composition rule: Then we directly have that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ
′. Once again by
following the same proof as in Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ
′), we deduce thatΦ·[tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ xiσ
′.
◭
B.3 Signcrypt encapsulation
◮ Lemma 22. Let aEsigncrypt ∈ Tag. Let Esigncrypt = sign(〈aEsigncrypt, aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, x〉, pk(y))〉, z)
with tEsigncrypt = x and XEsigncrypt = (y, z). We have that (Esigncrypt, ∅) is a {aEsigncrypt}-tagged encapsula-
tion and S = {(Esigncrypt, ∅)} allows secure channels.
Proof. Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. Since S =
{(Esigncrypt, ∅)}, we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote
tEi = xi and XEi = (yi, zi). Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and
let Φ be a ground frame such that aEsigncrypt < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢
xiσ}. We show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Properties 1, 2, 4 and 6 of Definition 7 hold.
We first prove that for all term t such that aEsigncrypt < st(t), Φ ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t impliesΦ ·[xkσ]k∈I ⊢
t. Assume that P is minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND∪Fcst or
t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEsigncrypt < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst
or t ∈ Φ. Therefore, Φ ⊢ t and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exist j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that
P′ = |Φ| + j. Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exist ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that
P′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈ st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By
Lemma 19, we deduce that either t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey
and u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t). Since aEsigncrypt < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all
E1, . . . ,En are equal after variable renaming, we deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition
rule. Since ir is a decomposition rule, we in fact have P′′ = ir(P′,R) where ir the rule sign-decomp
and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R vk(z jσ). Moreover, we have t
′′ = 〈aEsigncrypt, aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, x jσ〉, pk(y jσ))〉.
Once again since aEsigncrypt < st(t), we deduce that P
′′
, P. Thus, there exists Q = ir′(Q1, . . . ,Qℓ)
and ℓ′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} such that Q ∈ st(P) and Qℓ′ = P
′′.
By the Lemma 19, we can easily show that ir′ cannot be a composition rule for some g < Fkey
since if would imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q Erσ for some r which would contradict our hypothesis on
the minimality of |P|. We also show that ir′ cannot be is a composition rule for some g ∈ Fkey. In such
a case, it would imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q g(t
′′). But since aEsigncrypt ∈ st(t
′′), then Q , P and so
there must be another inference rule ir′′ applied on Q in P. Once again, by Lemma 19, ir′′ cannot be a
composition rule for any function symbol since it would imply that g(t′′) ∈ st(Φ)∪st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
)∪st(t)
but Esigncrypt only contain the function symbol pk applied on y. But since aEsigncrypt < st(σ), we
deduce that pk(yk)σ , g(t
′′) for all k. Moreover, ir′′ cannot be a decomposition rule either since the
only rule involving a function symbol g ∈ Fkey as argument is the signature decomposition which
would imply that there exists a term v and a proof R ∈ st(P) such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R sign(v, t
′′).
Once again, this is prevented by Lemma 19 since aEsigncrypt < st(σ). Therefore, we can conclude that
ir′ cannot be a composition rule for some g ∈ Fkey.
Thus ir′ is a decomposition rule and in fact the second decomposition of the pairing implying that
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, x jσ〉, pk(y jσ)). Using a similar reasoning as above, we can prove
that there exists R = ir′′(R1, . . . ,Rp) and p
′ ∈ {1, . . . , p} such that R ∈ st(P) and Rp′ = Q. Moreover,
by Lemma 19, ir′′ cannot be a f-composition for f < Fkey since the only function f possible would
be the pair but it would contradict our minimality hypothesis. Similarly as above, we can also prove
that ir′ cannot be f-composition for f ∈ Fkey. Therefore, it remains that ir
′′ is a decomposition rule
meaning that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R 〈aEsigncrypt, x jσ〉. But it also implies that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ x jσ meaning
that j ∈ I and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ 〈aEsigncrypt, x jσ〉.
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We have just shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there
exists a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j and a term u such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
u and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j
u. Therefore, by replacing all instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This allows us to conclude.
Property 1: For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ, ziσ}, we have that aEsigncrypt < st(t).
Hence we can apply the property we just proved which allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei)rX and v ∈ st(E j)rX such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉.
By definition of Esigncrypt, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of Esigncrypt such that
u = Ei|p and v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 4: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consider a minimal proof P for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P xiσ.
We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ or xiσ = Ekσ for
some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEsigncrypt < st(xiσ). Hence, we deduce that xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ.
Therefore, Φ ⊢ xiσ and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ xiσ.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Following exactly the proof of the property we prove at the beginning of
this lemma, we deduce that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there
exists a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j such that P|p′
j
= ir1(ir2(ir3(|Φ| + j,Q j)),R j), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
〈aEsigncrypt, x jσ〉, Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q j vk(z jσ) and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R j y jσ where ir1 is the decomposition
rule of aenc, ir2 is the second decomposition rule of 〈 〉 and ir3 is the decomposition of sign. Let us
look at the proofs Q j and R j. Since aEBAC < st(y jσ, z jσ), we can deduce by minimality of |P| that
|Φ| + j < Q j and |Φ| + j < R j (otherwise, using the same reasoning, it would imply that there exists
a proof Q′
j
∈ st<(Q j) (resp. R
′
j
) deducing vk(z jσ) (resp. y jσ)). Thus, Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢Q j vk(z jσ)
and Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢R j y jσ. Let I
′ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} − j | Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢ xiσ}. Note that
I′ ⊆ I − j. By applying Property 1 on y jσ and vk(z jσ) with [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j and I
′, we deduce that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I′ ⊢ y jσ and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I′ ⊢ vk(z jσ).
Therefore, we have proven that if |Φ|+i ∈ st(P) thenΦ·[xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ yiσwhich satisfies Property 4.
Otherwise, if for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, P|p j = |Φ| + j implies that i , j then we
also have proven that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ x jσ by the first property proven in this lemma.
Property 6: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ some ground substitution such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′.
Consider a proof P minimal for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that
Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1 due to the fact that aEsigncrypt < st(Φ). Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we already know that Ei ∼ Ek then the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
Case ir is a decomposition rule: By Lemma 19, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
).
But since aEsigncrypt < st(Φ) ∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the
minimality of |P|.
Case ir is a composition rule: In such a case, we have P = ir(P1, P2) and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P1
〈aEsigncrypt, aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, xiσ
′〉, pk(yiσ
′))〉 and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P2 ziσ
′. The latter already gives
us part of Property thanks to the first property of the lemma. Let us now focus on P1.
If the last rule of P1 starts by a decomposition rule, then by Lemma 19, we deduce that 〈aEsigncrypt,
aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, xiσ
′〉, pk(yiσ
′))〉 ∈ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
) which would then imply that there exists k ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that xiσ
′ = xkσ and yiσ
′ = ykσ. Therefore the result holds. If the last rule of P2 is
a composition then we have P1 = ir
′(Q1,Q2) whereΦ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q2 aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, xiσ
′〉, pk(yiσ
′)).
If the last rule of Q2 is a composition rule then it would imply thatΦ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ 〈aEsigncrypt, xiσ
′〉
and so Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ
′ which would allow us to conclude. If on the other hand the last rule of
Q2 is a decomposition rule, then once again we would deduce that aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, xiσ
′〉, pk(yiσ
′)) ∈
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st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
) and so there would exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that xiσ
′ = xkσ and yiσ
′ = ykσ. This
allows us to conclude.
◭
B.4 Sign encapsulation
◮ Lemma 23. Let aEsign ∈ Tag. Let Esign = sign(〈aEsign, x〉, y) with tEsigncrypt = x and XEsign = y. We
have that (Esign, vk(y)) is a {aEsign}-tagged encapsulation and S = {(Esign, vk(y))} allows authentic
channels.
Proof. Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. Since S =
{(Esigncrypt, vk(y))}, we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote
tEi = x and XE = yi. Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ
be a ground frame such that aEsigncrypt < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}.
We show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Properties 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Definition 7 hold.
We first prove that for all term t such that aEsign < st(t), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t implies Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Assume that P is minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst
or t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEsign < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst
or t ∈ Φ. Therefore, Φ ⊢ t and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exist j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that
P′ = |Φ| + j. Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exist ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that
P′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈ st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By
Lemma 19, we deduce that either t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and
u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t). Since aEsign < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En
are equal after variable renaming, we deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule.
Since ir is a decomposition rule, we in fact have P′′ = ir(P′,R) where ir the rule sign-decomp and
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R vk(y jσ). Moreover, we have t
′′ = 〈aEsign, x jσ〉. But it also implies thatΦ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢
x jσ meaning that j ∈ I and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ 〈aEsign, x jσ〉.
We have just shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there
exists a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j and a term u such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
u and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j
u. Therefore, by replacing all instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This allows us to conclude.
Property 1: For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ}, we have that aEsign < st(t). Hence we
can apply the property we just proved which allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei)rX and v ∈ st(E j)rX such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉.
By definition of Esigncrypt, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of Esigncrypt such that
u = Ei|p and v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 3: We directly have that {sign(〈aEsign, x〉, y), vk(y)} ⊢ x.
Property 6: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ some ground substitution such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′.
Consider a proof P minimal for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that
Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1 due to the fact that aEsign < st(Φ). Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we already know that Ei ∼ Ek then the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
Case ir is a decomposition rule: By Lemma 19, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
).
But since aEsign < st(Φ) ∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the
minimality of |P|.
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Case ir is a composition rule: In such a case, we have P = ir(P1, P2) and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P1
〈aEsign, xiσ
′〉 and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P2 ziσ
′. Using the first property of the lemma, the result holds.
◭
B.5 MAC encapsulation
◮ Lemma 24. Let aEmac ∈ Tag. Let Emac = 〈x, h(〈aEmac, x, y〉)〉 with tEmac = x and XEmac = y. We
have that (Emac, ∅) is a {aEmac}-tagged encapsulation and S = {(Emac, ∅)} allows authentic channels.
Proof. Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. Since S =
{(Esigncrypt, vk(y))}, we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote
tEi = x and XE = yi. Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ
be a ground frame such that aEmac < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}. In
fact we have I = {1, . . . , n}. We show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Properties 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Definition 7
hold.
We first prove that for all term t such that aEmac < st(t), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t implies Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Assume that P is minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst
or t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEmac < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst
or t ∈ Φ. Therefore, Φ ⊢ t and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exist j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that
P′ = |Φ| + j. Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exist ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that
P′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈ st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By
Lemma 19, we deduce that either t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and
u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t). Since aEmac < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En
are equal after variable renaming, we deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule.
Since ir is a decomposition rule, we in fact have P′′ = ir(P′) where ir is one of the decomposition of
〈 〉, and so either t′′ = x jσ or t
′′ = h(〈aEmac, x jσ, y jσ〉). If it is the latter then since aEmac < st(t),
we deduce that P , P′′ meaning that there exists Q = ir′(Q1, . . . ,Qℓ) and ℓ
′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} such that
Q ∈ st(P) and Qℓ′ = P
′′. But there is no decomposition rule for h therefore ir′ is necessarily a
composition rule.
By the Lemma 19, we can easily show that ir′ cannot be a composition rule for some g < Fkey
since if would imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q Erσ for some r which would contradict our hypothesis on
the minimality of |P|. We also show that ir′ cannot be is a composition rule for some g ∈ Fkey. In
such a case, it would imply that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q g(t
′′). But since aEmac ∈ st(t
′′), then Q , P and so
there must be another inference rule ir′′ applied on Q in P. Once again, by Lemma 19, ir′′ cannot be a
composition rule for any function symbol since it would imply that g(t′′) ∈ st(Φ)∪st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
)∪st(t)
but Emac does not contain function symbol from Fkey and aEmac < st(t, σ,Φ). Moreover, ir
′′ cannot
be a decomposition rule either since the only rule involving a function symbol g ∈ Fkey as argument
is the signature decomposition which would imply that there exists a term v and a proof R ∈ st(P)
such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢R sign(v, t
′′). Once again, this is prevented by Lemma 19. Therefore, we can
conclude that ir′ cannot be a composition rule for some g ∈ Fkey.
We just have proven that if t′′ = h(〈aEmac, x jσ, y jσ〉) then ir
′ cannot be a composition nor a
decomposition rule which is a contradiction. Hence t′′ = x jσ. Therefore, we have just shown that
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there exists a prefix p
′
j
of p j
and a proof Q j such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
x jσ and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j xσ. Therefore, by replacing all
instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This allows us to
conclude.
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Property 1: For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ}, we have that aEsign < st(t). Hence we
can apply the property we just proved which allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei)rX and v ∈ st(E j)rX such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉.
By definition of Esigncrypt, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of Esigncrypt such that
u = Ei|p and v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 3: We directly have that {〈x, h(〈aEmac, x, y〉)〉} ⊢ x.
Property 6: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ some ground substitution such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′.
Consider a proof P minimal for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that
Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1 due to the fact that aEmac < st(Φ). Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we already know that Ei ∼ Ek then the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
Case ir is a decomposition rule: By Lemma 19, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
).
But since aEmac < st(Φ) ∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the
minimality of |P|.
Case ir is a composition rule: In such a case, we have P = ir(P1, P2) and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P1 xiσ
′
and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P2 h(〈aEmac, xiσ
′, yiσ
′〉). Let us focus on P2. Since aEmac < st(Φ, σ), we have
that P2 starts by either a decomposition rule or a composition rule. If it is the latter then we have
that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ yσ′ and so the result would hold with the first property of the lemma. If it is
the former, then by Lemma 19, we would have that h(〈aEmac, xiσ
′, yiσ
′〉) ∈ st({Ekσ}
)
k=1
. It would
imply that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that xkσ = xiσ
′ and ykσ = yiσ
′. Hence with the first
property of the lemma, the result holds.
◭
B.6 Aenc encapsulation
◮ Lemma 25. Let aEaenc ∈ Tag. Let ETLS = aenc(〈aEaenc, x〉, pk(y)), tEaenc = x and XEaenc =
y. We have that (Eaenc, pk(y)) is a {aEaenc}-tagged encapsulation and S = {(ETLS, pk(y))} allows
confidential channels.
Proof. Let (E1, ∅), . . . , (En, ∅) ∈ S such that the variables of E1, . . . ,En are disjoints. Since S =
{(ETLS, ∅)}, we have that Ei ∼ E j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote tEi = xi
and XEi = yi. Let σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) ⊆ vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be a
ground frame such that aEaenc < st(σ,Φ). Finally, let I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ}. We
show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Properties 1, 2, 4 and 5 of Definition 7 hold.
Property 1: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let t ∈ T (Fkey, {yiσ}) such thatΦ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P t. Assume that P is
minimal for |P|. We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either t ∈ ND ∪Fcst or t ∈ Φ or t = Ekσ
for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aETLS < st(t). Hence, we deduce that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or t ∈ Φ. Therefore,
Φ ⊢ t and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Let us assume that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P′ ∈ st(P) such that
P′ = |Φ| + j. Since |P| > 1, we deduce that there exists ir, P′′, P1, . . . , Pm, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such
that P′′ = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) ∈ st(P) and Pℓ = P
′. Let us denote t′′ the term Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ t
′′. By
Lemma 19, we deduce that either t′′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st(t) or t′′ = g(u) for some g ∈ Fkey and
u ∈ st<(Φ) ∪ st<(Ekσ)
n
k=1
∪ st<(t). Since aEaenc < st(t, σ,Φ), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′ E jσ and all E1, . . . ,En
are equal after variable renaming, we deduce that in both cases, ir cannot be a composition rule.
Therefore ir is the decomposition rule of aenc and we have Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ 〈aEaenc, x jσ〉. Thus
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P′′ 〈x jσ and so j ∈ I. Hence, Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ 〈aETLS, x jσ〉.
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We have just shown that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there
exists a prefix p′
j
of p j, a proof Q j and a term u such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
u and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢Q j
u. Therefore, by replacing all instances of P|p′
j
in P by Q j, we obtain that a proof P
′ such that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢P′ t. This allows us to conclude.
Property 2: Let u ∈ st(Ei)rX and v ∈ st(E j)rX such that u and v are unifiable and root(u) , 〈〉.
By definition of Eaenc, u, v unifiable implies that there exists a position p of ETLS such that u = Ei|p
and v = E j|p. Since Ei ∼ E j then the result holds.
Property 4: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Consider a minimal proof P for |P| such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P xiσ.
We do a case analysis on |P|. If |P| = 1 then either xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ or xiσ = Ekσ for
some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. But aEaenc < st(xiσ). Hence, we deduce that xiσ ∈ ND ∪ Fcst or xiσ ∈ Φ.
Therefore, Φ ⊢ xiσ and so Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ xiσ.
Otherwise, |P| > 1. Following exactly the proof of Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ), we deduce
that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, if P|p j = |Φ| + j then there exists a prefix p
′
j
of p j,
a proof Q j such that P|p′
j
= ir1(|Φ| + j,Q j), Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P|p′
j
〈aETLS, x jσ〉 and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢Q j y jσ
where ir1 is the decomposition rule of aenc. Let us look at the proof Q j. Since aEaenc < st(y jσ),
we can deduce by minimality of |P| that |Φ| + j < Q j (otherwise, using the same reasoning, it would
imply that there exists a proof Q′
j
∈ st<(Q j) deducing yiσ). Thus, Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢Q j y jσ. Let
I′ = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} − j | Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j ⊢ xiσ}. Note that I
′ ⊆ I − j. By applying Property 1 on
y jσ with [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n}− j and I
′, we deduce that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I′ ⊢ y jσ.
Therefore, we have proven that if |Φ| + i ∈ st(P) then Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ yiσ. Otherwise, if for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all position p j of P, P|p j = |Φ| + j implies that i , j then we also have proven that
Φ · [xkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ x jσ using the same replacement of proofs as in the proof of Property 1. Hence, the
result holds.
Property 5: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ′ be some ground substitution such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ Eiσ
′
and aEaenc < st(σ
′). We focus first on the left implication of the equivalence. If Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ xiσ
′
and Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ pk(yi)σ
′ then we directly have that Φ · [xkσ]k∈I ⊢ Eiσ
′. But since for all k ∈ I,
Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n} ⊢ xkσ, we deduce thatΦ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n} ⊢ Eiσ
′. Otherwise, there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that Eiσ
′ = E jσ and so we directly have that Φ · [Ekσ]k∈{1,...,n} ⊢ Eiσ
′.
Let us now focus on the right implication of the equivalence. Consider a proof Pminimal for |P|
such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢P Eiσ
′. If |P| = 1 then it implies that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]k=1 due to the fact that
aEaenc < st(Φ). Therefore, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Eiσ
′ = Ekσ. Since we already know
that Ei ∼ Ek then the result holds.
Otherwise |P| > 1. In such a case P = ir(P1, . . . , Pn). We do a case analysis on ir.
Case ir is a decomposition rule: by Lemma 19, we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ st(Φ) ∪ st([Ekσ]
n
k=1
).
But since aEaenc < st(Φ) ∪ st(σ), then we deduce that Eiσ
′ ∈ [Ekσ]
n
k=1
which contradicts the
minimality of |P|.
Case ir is a composition rule: Then we directly have that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ xiσ
′ and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢
pk(yiσ
′). Once again by following the same proof as in Property 1 (replacing t by xiσ
′), we
deduce that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ xiσ
′ and Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ pk(yiσ
′) and so the result holds.
◭
B.7 Proof of Theorem 8
◮ Lemma 26. Let Se be a set of Tag-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure
channels. Let Φ be a ground frame and σ be a ground substitution such that Tag∩ st(σ,Φ) = ∅. Let
(E1,F1), . . . , (En,Fn) ∈ Se. Assume that the variables in E1, . . . ,En are disjoint. Let I be the set of
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i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ. For all terms t, if Tag ∩ st(t) = ∅ and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ t
then Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Proof. Consider (En+1,Fn+1) ∈ Se such that the variables of En+1 are disjoint from E1, . . . ,En. Take
σ′ the ground substitution such that tEn+1σ
′ = a ∈ ND and for all x ∈ XEn+1 , xσ
′ = t. Since
Tag ∩ st(t) = ∅, we deduce that Tag ∩ st(σσ′) = ∅. Moreover, we have t ∈ T (Fkey,XEn+1σσ
′).
We also that thatΦ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ t implies thatΦ · [Ekσσ
′]n
k=1
⊢ t which impliesΦ · [Ekσσ
′]n+1
k=1
⊢ t.
On the other hand, since a ∈ ND and for all x ∈ XEn+1 , xσ
′ = t with Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ t, we deduce that
Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ En+1σ
′. Hence for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ then Φ · [Ekσσ
′]n+1
k=1
⊢ tEiσ.
Thus by applying Property 1 of Definition 7, we deduce that Φ · [tEkσσ
′]k∈I ⊢ t and so Φ ·
[tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ t. ◭
◮ Lemma 27. Let Se be a set of tagA-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure
channels. Let S′e be a set of tagB-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure chan-
nels. If tagA ∩ tagB = ∅ then Se ∪ S
′
e is a set of tagA ∪ tagB-encapsulations allowing authentic,
confidential and secure channels.
Proof. Let (E1,F1), . . . , (En,Fn) ∈ Se∪S
′
e. Assume that the variables in E1, . . . ,En are disjoint. Let
σ be a ground substitution such that dom(σ) = vars(E1, . . . ,En) and let Φ be a ground frame such
that (tagA ∪ tagB) ∩ st(σ,Φ) = ∅. Let I be the set of i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ. Let
us denote by A = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | (Ei,Fi) ∈ Se} and B = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | (Ei,Fi) ∈ S
′
e}. Moreover, let
us denote by IA = I ∩ A and IB = I ∩ B. We first start proving the following property:
Property 0: For all term t, if (tagA ∪ tagB) ∩ st(t) = ∅ and Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ t then Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Assume w.l.o.g. that i ∈ A. Let us denote Φ′ = Φ · [Ekσ]k∈B. We have Φ
′ · [Ekσ]k∈A ⊢ t. But
(tagA ∪ tagB) ∩ st(σ,Φ) = ∅ and so tagA ∩ st(σ,Φ) = ∅. Moreover, IA is the set of i ∈ A such that
Φ′ · [Ekσ]k∈A ⊢ tEiσ. Since Se be a set of tagA-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and
secure channels, we deduce by Lemma 26 that Φ′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA ⊢ t.
If nowwe denoteΦ′′ = Φ ·[tEkσ]k∈IA , we obtain thatΦ
′′ ·[Ekσ]k∈B ⊢ t. Consider the set I
′
B
of i ∈ B
such thatΦ′′ · [Ekσ]k∈B ⊢ tEiσ. We show that I
′
B
= IB. If i ∈ IB then we know thatΦ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ.
By applying onc again Lemma 26 on Φ′, A and IA, we deduce that Φ
′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA ⊢ tEiσ and so
Φ′′ · [Ekσ]k∈B ⊢ tEiσ meaning that i ∈ I
′
B
. If i ∈ I′
B
, we know that Φ′′ · [Ekσ]k∈B ⊢ tEiσ and so
Φ′ ·[tEkσ]k∈IA ⊢ tEiσ. But for all j ∈ IA,Φ
′ ·[Ekσ]k∈A ⊢ tE jσ. Hence we deduce thatΦ
′ ·[Ekσ]k∈A ⊢ tEiσ
and so Φ ·[Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ. This allows us to conclude that IB = I
′
B
. Thus, we can apply Lemma 26 on
Φ′′, IB and twhich allows us to deduce thatΦ
′′ ·[tEkσ]k∈IB ⊢ t and so we conclude thatΦ ·[tEkσ]k∈I ⊢ t.
Property 1: Direct application of Property 0.
Property 2: Let i, i′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let u ∈ st(Ei) \ X and let v ∈ st(Ei′ ) \ X such that u and v are
unifiable and root(u) , 〈 〉. Thus tagA ∩ tagB = ∅, we deduce that either i, i
′ ∈ A or i, i′ ∈ B. In such
a case the result directly holds by applying Property 2 of Definition 7 on either A or B.
Property 3: Direct from Definition 7.
Property 4: Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEiσ. Assume w.l.o.g. that i ∈ A. Let us
denote Φ′ = Φ · [Ekσ]k∈B. Thus by applying Property 4 of Definition 7 on Φ
′, σ, IA, we deduce that
Φ′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA−i ⊢ tEiσ or there exists x ∈ XEi such that Φ
′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA−i ⊢ xσ.
Let us Φ′′ = Φ · [tEkσ]k∈IA−i. Consider I
′
B
the set of j ∈ B such that Φ′′ · [Ekσ]k∈B ⊢ tE jσ. We
know that for all k ∈ IA − i, Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tEkσ. Therefore, we deduce that Φ · [Ekσ]
n
k=1
⊢ tE jσ and so
I′
B
⊆ IB. Hence by applying Lemma 26 on Φ
′′, I′
B
and xσ or tEiσ, we deduce that Φ
′′ · [tEkσ]k∈I′B ⊢ xσ
or Φ′′ · [tEkσ]k∈I′B ⊢ tEiσ. But considering that I
′
B
⊆ IB, we deduce that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ xσ or
Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I−i ⊢ tEiσ. Hence the result holds.
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Property 5 and 6: Similar proof as Property 4, that is we assume w.l.o.g. that i ∈ A, we apply
Property 5 (resp. 6) on the frame Φ′ = Φ · [Ekσ]k∈B and IA, and when we are in the case of
Φ′ · [tEkσ]k∈IA deduces a term u, we use Lemma 26 on Φ
′′ = Φ · [tEkσ]k∈IA , IB and u to obtain
that Φ · [tEkσ]k∈I deduce u. ◭
◮ Theorem 8. The following encapsulations are:
authentic: Esign = sign(〈aEsign, x〉, x1) and Emac = 〈x, h(〈aEmac, x, x1〉)〉;
confidential: Eaenc = aenc(〈aEaenc, x〉, pk(x1));
secure: ETLS = senc(〈aETLS, x〉, x1), EBAC = 〈t,mac(〈aEBAC, t〉, x2)〉 with t = senc(〈aEBAC, x〉, x1),
and Esigncrypt = sign(〈aEsigncrypt, aenc(〈aEsigncrypt, x〉, pk(x1))〉, x2).
where aEsign, aEmac, aEaenc, aETLS, aEBAC, aEsigncrypt are constants.
Moreover, the set {(Esign, {vk(x1)}), (Emac, ∅), (Eaenc, {pk(x1)}), (ETLS, ∅), (EBAC, ∅), (Esigncrypt, ∅)}
allowsfor authentic, confidential and secure channels.
Proof. Lemmas 20, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 24 give us that the encapsulations individually allows se-
cure, confidential, authentic channels. Thus the proof is concluded by successive applications of
Lemma 27 since all the encapsulations are tagged differently. ◭
C Proofs of Theorem 17
C.1 Properties on the composed frame
We say that a term t is a tagA-term if t = f(〈a, t1〉, t2, . . . , tn) where a ∈ tagA for some t1, . . . , tn.
◮ Definition 28. Let S be a set of tagA-tagged encapsulations. Let Φ = [u1; . . . ; un] be a frame. Let
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. We say that Φ is an executed frame for S and I if:
for all i ∈ I, ui = EiΣi for some ground substitutions Σi and some encapsulation (Ei,Fi) ∈ S; and
for all i ∈ I (resp i < I), for all t ∈ vars(Ei)Σi (resp. t ∈ {ui}), for all positions p of t, if t|p is a
tagA-term then:
either p = p′ · a · p′′ for some position p′, p′′ and there exists j ∈ I such that j < i, t|p′ ·a, t|p ∈
st(E jΣ j) r st(Σ j) and [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p′ ·a;
or [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p.
◮ Corollary 29. Let S be a set of tagA-tagged encapsulations. Let Φ = [u1; . . . ; un] be an executed
frame for S and some set I. For all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, [u1; . . . ; uk] is an executed frame for S and
I r {k + 1; . . . ; n}.
In the rest of the section, if Φ = [u1; . . . ; un] is an executed frame for S and I then for all i ∈ I,
we will always denote by EiΣi the term un as described in the above definition.
◮ Lemma 30. Let S be a set tagA-tagged encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame and I ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}.
Assume that Φ is an executed frame for S and I. We have that for all t ∈ T (F ,N), if Φ ⊢ t then for
all positions p of t, if t|p is a tagA-term then:
either p = p′ · a · p′′ for some position p′, p′′ and there exists j ∈ I such that t|p′ ·a, t|p ∈
st(E jΣ j) r st(Σ j) and Φ ⊢ t|p′ ·a;
or Φ ⊢ t|p.
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Proof. Let us denote by P the minimal proof such that Φ ⊢P t. Let us denote Φ = [u1; . . . ; un]. We
prove this result by induction |P|.
Base case |P| = 1: In such a case, either t ∈ ND or there exists i < I such that t = ui or there
exists i ∈ I such that t = EiΣi. However, In the first case, the result trivially holds.
In the second case, by Definition 28, we know that for all positions p of t, if t|p is a tagA-term
then:
either p = p′ · a · p′′ for some position p′, p′′ and there exists j ∈ I such that j < i, t|p′ ·a, t|p ∈
st(E jΣ j) r st(Σ j) and [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p′ ·a which implies that Φ ⊢ t|p′ ·a
or [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p which implies that Φ ⊢ t|p.
Therefore the result holds.
In the third case, for all positions p of EiΣi, we distinguish whether t|p ∈ st(EiΣi) r st(Σi) or not.
In the latter, it implies that t|p ∈ st(Σi) and so there exists t
′ ∈ vars(Ei)Σi and a position p
′ such that
t′|p′ = t|p and p
′ is a suffix or p. Therefore, by Definition 28 (instantiating t and p of the definition
by t′ and p′ respectively), we obtain that if t′|p′ is a tagA-term then:
either p′ = p′′ ·a · p′′′ for some position p′′, p′′′ and there exists j ∈ I such that j < i, t′|p′′ ·a, t
′|p′ ∈
st(E jΣ j) r st(Σ j) and [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p′ ·a. Since p
′ is a suffix of p then p = q · p′ for some q.
And so we obtain that p = (q · p′′) · a · p′′′, t|(q·p′′)·a, t|p ∈ st(E jΣ j)r st(Σ j) and Φ ⊢ t|p. Hence the
result holds.
or [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t|p which implies that Φ ⊢ t|p.
In the former case, that is t|p ∈ st(E jΣ j) r st(Σ j), the result directly holds since t = EiΣi and Φ ⊢ t.
Inductive step |P| > 1 and the last rule of P is a composition: In such a case, t = f(t1, . . . , tm) and
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Φ ⊢ ti. Therefore, we can apply our inductive hypothesis on all t1, . . . , tn which
allows us to conclude for all position p of t different from ε. However, in the case where p = ε, we
know by hypothesis that Φ ⊢ t and so the result trivially holds.
Inductive step |P| > 1 and the last rule of P is a decomposition: Since P is minimal, we know
that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that t ∈ st(ui). Thus, we can apply the same reasoning as in the
base case |P| = 1. This allows us to conclude. ◭
◮ Definition 31. Let S be a set tagA-tagged encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame and I ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}.
Assume that Φ is an executed frame for S and I. Let σ be a substitution. We say that σ is an
executed substitution for Φ if for all t ∈ img(σ), for all positions p of t, if t|p is a tagA-term then:
either p = p′ ·a · p′′ for some position p′, p′′ and there exists j ∈ I such that t|p′ ·a, t|p ∈ st(E jΣ j)r
st(Σ j) and Φ ⊢ t|p′ ·a;
or Φ ⊢ t|p.
C.2 Transformation on composition frame and encapsulations
◮ Definition 32. Let δ be a mapping from terms to nonces. We define the application of δ on a term
u, denoted Apδ(u), as follows:
if u ∈ dom(δ) then Apδ(u) = uδ;
else if u ∈ N ∪ X then Apδ(u) = u;
else u = f(u1, . . . , un) and Apδ(u) = f(Apδ(u1), . . . ,Apδ(un)) for some f, u1, . . . , un.
◮ Definition 33. We say that δ is a tagA-mapping of a frame Φ when names(Φ) ∩ img(δ) = ∅,
img(δ) ∈ ND and dom(δ) ⊇ {t ∈ st(Φ) | t is a tagA-term}.
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◮ Lemma 34. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure
channels. Let (E, ℓ, S ) ∈ S. For all substitution Σ, for all tagA-mapping δ of [EΣ], for all position p
of E, there exists a context C[_] built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst (possibly just a hole) such that
EΣ|p = C[u1, . . . , un];
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ui is either a tagA-term of dom(δ) or ui ∈ vars(E)Σ or a term of the form
f(v) for some f ∈ Fkey and v ∈ XEΣ ∪ Fcst.
Apδ(EΣ|p) = C[Apδ(u1), . . . ,Apδ(un)];
EApδ(Σ)|p = C[v1, . . . , vn];
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, ui is (resp. not) a tagA-term implies vi is a tagA-term (resp. vi = Apδ(ui)).
Proof. By Definition 5, we know that E is a fully tagA-term of T (F , {x, x1, . . . , xn}) such that for all
t ∈ st(E),
if root(t) = f ∈ Fkey then t = f(y) with y ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} ∪ Fcst
if t = f(t′, t1, . . . , tn) and there exists an inference rule ir(f(y, u1, . . . , un), v1, . . . , vm) → y then for
all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, v j = g(ui) implies that ti ∈ {x, x1, . . . , xℓ}.
Let t, s1, . . . , sℓ be some terms. We prove the different properties by induction on H − |p| where H is
the maximal size of all positions in E.
Base case |p| > H: Such a case is impossible since H is the maximal size of all positions in E.
Inductive case |p| ≤ H: By Definition of a fully tagA-term, we know that either root(E|p) ∈
Fcst∪{x, x1, . . . , xn, 〈 〉} or E|p is a tagA-term. We do a case analysis. If root(E|p) ∈ Fcst then the result
trivially holds with C = E. If root(E|p) ∈ {x, x1, . . . , xn} then the result trivially holds with C = _.
If root(E|p) = 〈 〉 then E|p = 〈E|p·1,E|p·2〉. It implies that Apδ(E|pΣ) = 〈Apδ(E|p·1Σ),Apδ(E|p·2Σ)〉
and that EApδ(Σ)|p = 〈M1,M2〉 with M1 = EApδ(Σ)|p·1 and M2 = EApδ(Σ)|p·2. Therefore, we can
apply our inductive hypothesis on p · 1 and p · 2 which show the existence of a context C1 and C2
satisfying their respective properties. We conclude with C = 〈C1,C2〉. Lastly, if E|p is a tagA-term,
then E|p = f(〈a,E|p·1·2〉,E|p·2, . . . ,E|p·m) for some a ∈ tagA and some integerm. Therefore,EApδ(Σ)|p
is also a tagA-term. Hence the result holds with C = _. ◭
◮ Lemma 35. Let (E,F) be a tagA-tagged encapsulation. Let Σ be a ground substitution. Let δ be a
tagA-mapping of [EΣ]. For all position p of E, if there exists a term t such that names(t)∩ img(δ) = ∅
and Apδ(t) = EApδ(Σ)|p then E|p does not contain tagA-tagged term and t = EΣ|p.
Proof. We prove the result by a downward induction on |p|:
Base case E|p ∈ X: In such a case, we directly have that EApδ(Σ)|p = Apδ(E|pΣ) = Apδ(EΣ|p).
Thus t = EΣ|p since names(t) ∩ img(δ) = ∅. Moreover, E|p ∈ X implies E|p does not contain
tagA-tagged term.
Inductive case root(E|p) = 〈〉: In such a case, E|p = 〈E1,E2〉. Thus Definition 32 and Apδ(t) =
EApδ(Σ)|p imply that there exists t1, t2 such that t = 〈t1, t2〉 and Apδ(ti) = EApδ(Σ)|p·i for i = 1, 2.
Therefore, by our inductive hypothesis, we deduce that for i = 1, 2, E|p·i does not contain tagA-tagged
term and ti = EΣ|p·i. Since root(E|p) = 〈〉, we can conclude that E|p does not contain tagA-tagged
term and t = EΣ|p
Inductive case root(E|p) , 〈〉: Otherwise, since E is a fully tagA-tagged encapsulation, we
deduce that E|p = f(〈a,E1〉,E2, . . . ,En) for some a ∈ tagA and some f ∈ F . Thus Definition 32
and Apδ(t) = EApδ(Σ)|p imply that there exists t1, . . . , tn such that t = f(〈a, t1〉, t2, . . . , tn), Apδ(t1) =
EApδ(Σ)|p·1·2 and for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, Apδ(ti) = EApδ(Σ)|p·i. By our inductive hypothesis, we deduce
that t1 = EΣ|p·1·2 and for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, ti = EΣ|p·i. Thus we deduce that t = EΣ|p. But we know
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that δ is a tagA-mapping of [EΣ] and EΣ|p is tagA-tagged term. Hence by Definition 32, Apδ(t) ∈ ND
which contradicts t = f(〈a, t1〉, t2, . . . , tn). Hence the case root(E|p) , 〈〉 is impossible. ◭
We can now define how we transform an executed frame Φ through a tagA-mapping of Φ.
◮ Definition 36. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and secure
channels. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint sets such that Φ is an executed frame for
S and D ∪ N ∪ H. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. We define the transformation of Φ by δ, D,N and
H, denoted TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ), recursively on |Φ| as follows:
if |Φ| = 0 then Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) is the empty frame
if Φ = Φ′ · [u] with |Φ| < D ∪ N ∪ H then Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) = Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ′) · [Apδ(u)]
if Φ = Φ′ · [u] with |Φ| ∈ D then Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) = Tr
H,δ
D−|Φ|,N
(Φ′) · [Apδ(t
i)];
if Φ = Φ′ · [u] with |Φ| ∈ N then Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) = Tr
H,δ
D,N−|Φ|
(Φ′).
if Φ = Φ′ · [u] with |Φ| ∈ H and (E|Φ|, ℓ|Φ|, S |Φ|) is an encapsulation allowing authentic channels
then Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) = Tr
H−|Φ|,δ
D,N
(Φ′) · [Apδ(t
i)];
else Φ = Φ′ · [u] and TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) = Tr
H−|Φ|,δ
D,N
(Φ′).
◮ Lemma 37. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three
disjoint sets such that I = D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. Assume that
Φ is an executed frame for S and I. We have that for all t ∈ dom(δ), if tδ ∈ names(Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ)) ∪
⋃
i∈I names(Apδ(Σi)) then Φ ⊢ t.
Proof. Let us denote Φ = [u1; . . . ; un] and Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) = [v1; . . . ; vm]. Let t ∈ dom(δ) such that
tδ ∈ names(Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ))∪
⋃
i∈I names(Apδ(Σi)). If tδ ∈ names(Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ)) then there exists j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
such that tδ ∈ names(v j). Following Definition 36, we deduce that there exists j ≤ i such that i < N
and:
either i < D ∪ H, v j = Apδ(ui) and so t ∈ st(ui)
or i ∈ D ∪ H, v j = Apδ(tEiΣi) and so t ∈ st(tEiΣi) ⊆ st(Σi).
If tδ ∈
⋃
i∈I names(Apδ(Σi)) then t ∈ st(Σi). Thus, we deduce that either t ∈
⋃
i<I st(ui) ∪
⋃
i∈I st(Σi).
Consider i < I (resp. i ∈ I) such that t ∈ st(ui) (resp. t ∈ st(Σi)). By Definition 28, since t is a
tagA-term, we deduce that either [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t or there exist t
′ ∈ st(ui) (resp. t
′ ∈ st(Σ)) and k < i
such that t ∈ st(t′) and t′, t ∈ st(EkΣk) r st(img(Σk)) and [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t
′.
In the former case, the result trivially holds. In the latter case, by Lemma 34, we know that
t′ = C[w1, . . . ,wn′ ] whereC is a context built on {〈 〉} ∪Fcst and for all wr ∈ {1, . . . , n
′}, wr is either a
tagA-term from dom(δ) or wr ∈ T (Fkey∪Fcst, img(Σ)). But we know that tδ ∈ names(Apδ(ui)) (resp.
tδ ∈ names(Apδ(Σi))) and t
′ ∈ st(ui) (resp. t
′ ∈ st(img(Σi))) and t ∈ st(t
′). Thus by Definition 32,
we deduce that there exists r ∈ {1, . . . , n′} such that wr = t. Since [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t
′ and C is built on
{〈 〉} ∪ Fcst, we deduce that [u1; . . . ; ui−1] ⊢ t and so the result holds. ◭
Given a set S ⊆ N, given i ∈ N, we denote by S |i the set { j ∈ S | j < i}.
C.3 Deducibility link between composed and abstract frame
◮ Definition 38. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three
disjoint sets such that D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. We say that Φ is a
well formed frame for S, D, N and H if the following properties hold:
Φ is an executed frame for S and D ∪ N ∪ H.
for all i ∈ D, Φ ⊢ ti.
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for all i ∈ N, Φ 0 ti.
for all i ∈ H, for all v ∈ XEiApδ(Σi), Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) 0 v
for all i ∈ H, for all v ∈ FiΣi, Tr
H|i ,δ
D|i ,N|i
(Φ) ⊢ v.
◮ Lemma 39. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint
sets such that I = D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. Assume that Φ is a
well formed frame for S, D, N and H. Let A = {a ∈ img(δ) | u ∈ dom(δ), uδ = a,Φ ⊢ u}. For all
t ∈ T (F ,N), if TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢ t and names(t) ∩ (img(δ) r A) = ∅ then:
if there exists t′ ∈ T (F ,N) such that names(t′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and Apδ(t
′) = t then Φ ⊢ t′.
if there exist i ∈ I, a position p of Ei such that t = EiApδ(Σi)|p then Φ ⊢ EiΣi|p.
Proof. Consider a minimal proof P of TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢ t. Let us denote Φ = [u1; . . . ; uN]
and Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) = [v1; . . . ; vM]. We prove the result by induction onM(P).
Base case M(P) = (0, 1): In such a case, we have that t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst. Assume first that
t < img(δ). In such a case, since names(Φ) ∩ img(δ) = ∅, it implies for all i ∈ I, for all position p
of Ei, t , EiApδ(Σi). On other hand, t ∈ ND ∪ Fcst and t < img(δ) also imply that t = Apδ(t) and
names(t) ∩ img(δ) = ∅. Hence Φ ⊢ t.
Assume now that t ∈ img(δ) then there exists t′ such that t = Apδ(t
′). Moreover, we know by
hypothesis that names(t) ∩ (img(δ) r A) = ∅ hence t ∈ A which allows us to deduce that Φ ⊢ t′.
Lastly, if there exists i ∈ I, a position p of Ei such that t = EiApδ(Σi) then by Lemma 35, we deduce
that t′ = EiΣi|p. Hence the result holds since Φ ⊢ t
′.
Base case M(P) = (i, 1): In such a case, we deduce that either t = vi or there exists k ∈ I such
that t = EkApδ(Σk).
Consider first the case t = EkApδ(Σk) and there exists j ∈ I and a position p of E j such that
t = E jApδ(Σ j)|p. Thus we have EkApδ(Σk) = E jApδ(Σ j)|p. By Definition 5, we know that there exists
C[_] built on {〈 〉} ∪Fcst and terms u1, . . . , un such that E j|p = C[u1, . . . , un] and for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n},
either ur ∈ T (Fkey,X) or ur is a tagA-tagged term. Moreover, with EkApδ(Σk) = E jApδ(Σ j)|p, we
deduce that EkApδ(Σk) = C[u1Apδ(Σ j), . . . , unApδ(Σ j)]. For all r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we do a case analysis
on ur and on its position q in C.
Case ur ∈ T (Fkey,X) and q is a position of Ek different from variable: In such a case, we
deduce that urApδ(Σ j) = Apδ(urΣ j) and so Apδ(urΣ j) = EkApδ(Σk)|q. But q being a position of
Ek implies, by Lemma 35, that urΣ j = EkΣk |q. Since C[_] built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst EkApδ(Σk) =
C[u1Apδ(Σ j), . . . , unApδ(Σ j)] and q is a position of Ek, we deduce that for all prefix q
′ of q,
root(EkΣk |q′) = 〈 〉 and so [EkΣk] ⊢ EkΣk |q. Since EkΣk ∈ Φ and EkΣk |q = urΣ j, we deduce that
Φ ⊢ urΣ j.
Case ur ∈ T (Fkey,X) and q is not a position of Ek different from variable: Once again, we
have urApδ(Σ j) = Apδ(urΣ j). However, q not being a position of Ek implies that there exists
y ∈ dom(Σk) and a prefix q
′ of q such that Apδ(yΣk) = E jApδ(Σ j)|p·q′ and p · q
′ is a position of E j.
By Lemma 35, we deduce that yΣk = E jΣ j|p·q′ . Similarly to the previous case, we deduce that all
prefix q′′ of q′, root(EkΣk |q′′ ) = 〈 〉 and so [EkΣk] ⊢ yΣk = E jΣ j|p·q′ . But urΣ j is deducible from
E jΣ j|p·q′ hence we can conclude that Φ ⊢ urΣ j.
Case ur is a tagA-tagged term and q is not a position of Ek different from variable: Since q is
not a position of Ek, then there exists y ∈ dom(Σk) and a prefix q
′ of q such that Apδ(yΣk) =
E jApδ(Σ j)|p·q′ . But by Lemma 35, it would imply that E j|p·q′ does not contain tagA-tagged term
which is a contradiction with ur being a tagA-tagged term. Therefore, this case is impossible.
Case ur is a tagA-tagged term and q is a position of Ek different from variable: In such a
case, E jApδ(Σ j)|p·q = urApδ(Σ j) = EkApδ(Σk)|q implies that Ek|q is also a tagA-tagged term.
36 Secure refinements of communication channels
By Property 2 of Definition 7, we deduce that img(mgu(E j|p·q,Ek|q))) ⊆ X. Thus for all po-
sition q′, if E j|p·q·q′ ∈ X then Ek |q·q′ ∈ X and E j|p·q·q′Apδ(Σ j) = Ek|q·q′Apδ(Σk) which implies
E j|p·q·q′Σ j = Ek |q·q′Σk. Therefore, we deduce that E jΣ j|p·q = EkΣk |q. But EkΣk |q is deducible from
EkΣk hence so is urΣ j.
This allows us to conclude that Φ ⊢ E j|pΣ j.
Consider now the case t = EkApδ(Σk) and there exists t
′ such that names(t′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and
Apδ(t
′) = t. By Lemma 35, we deduce that t′ = EkΣk and so we directly have that Φ ⊢ t
′.
Consider now the case t = vi and there exists j ∈ I, a position p of E j such that t = E jAp|(Σ j)p.
By Definition 36, we know that there exists t′ such that names(t′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and Apδ(t
′) = vi.
Hence we have that E jΣ j|p = t
′. By showing that Φ ⊢ t′, the result would thus yield. Therefore, we
focus on proving that Φ ⊢ t′ which coincides with the last case.
By Definition 36, we know that there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that i ≤ j and j < N and:
either j < D ∪ H and t = Apδ(u j). In such a case, since names(u j, t) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ then t
′ = u j.
Hence we directly have that Φ ⊢ t′.
or j ∈ D and vi = Apδ(tE jΣ j). Since names(tE jΣ j, t
′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅, we have that tE jΣ j = t. But by
hypothesis, we already know that Φ ⊢ tE jΣ j hence the result holds.
or j ∈ H, (E j, ℓ j, S j) is an encapsulation allows authentic channels and vi = Apδ(tE jΣ j). Once
again, since names(tE jΣ j, t
′) ∩ img(δ) = ∅, we deduce that tE jΣ j = t
′. Moreover, we know by
hypothesis the frame is well formed hence by Definition 38, we have that for all v ∈ F jApδ(Σ j),
Tr
H| j ,δ
D| j ,N| j
(Φ) ⊢ v. Following Definition 36, if we denote by P′ the proof of Tr
H| j ,δ
D| j ,N| j
(Φ) ⊢ v, we
obtain thatM(P′) < (i, 1). But by Definition 5, we know that each element of F j is of the form
f(y) where f ∈ Fkey and y ∈ X. Hence, we deduce that for all v
′ ∈ F jΣ j, there exists v ∈ F jApδ(Σ j)
such that Apδ(v
′) = v. Therefore it implies that for all v′ ∈ F jΣ j, Tr
H| j ,δ
D| j ,N|,
(Φ) ⊢P′ Apδ(v
′) with
M(P′) < (i, 1). By applying our inductive hypothesis, we deduce that for all v′ ∈ F jΣ j, Φ ⊢ v
′.
Therefore, by Property 3 of Definition 7, we deduce that Φ ⊢ tE jΣ j and so Φ ⊢ t
′.
Inductive caseM(P) > (i, j): Assume first that the last rule of P is a composition rule. In such a
case, t = f(t1, . . . , tn) for some terms t1, . . . , tn and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ)·[EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢ tk. If
there exists t′ such that Apδ(t
′) = t then by Definition 32, we deduce that t == f(Apδ(t1), . . . ,Apδ(tr))
for some t′
1
, . . . , t′r such that t
′ = f(t′
1
, . . . , t′r) and so for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Apδ(t
′
k
) = tk. Thus we can
apply our inductive hypothesis on all t′
1
, . . . , t′n and deduce that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢ t
′
k
which
allows us to conclude that Φ ⊢ t′
On the other hand, if there exists ℓ ∈ I and a position p of Eℓ such that t = EℓApδ(Σℓ)|p then either
Eℓ|p ∈ X or for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, tk = EℓApδ(Σℓ)|p·k with p · k a position of Eℓ. In the former case,
we deduce that there exists x ∈ Σℓ such that t = Apδ(xΣℓ). Therefore, we apply the same reasoning
as above. In the latter case, we can apply our inductive hypothesis on all t1, . . . , tk and so we deduce
that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢ EℓΣℓ|p·k which allows us to conclude.
Assume now that the last rule of P is a decomposition rule. Therefore, there exists x ∈ X,
u′
1
, . . . , u′n, v
′
1
, . . . , v′m ∈ T (Fkey,X), a substitution σ and some proofs P
′, P1, . . . , Pk such that:
t = xσ
vars(v′
1
, . . . , v′m) ⊆ {u
′
1
, . . . , u′n}; and
P = ir(P′, P1, . . . , Pm); and
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ)·[EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢P′ f(x, u
′
1
, . . . , u′n)σ and for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ)·[EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢Pk
v′
k
σ.
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Moreover, by minimality of P, we deduce that there exists i′ ≤ i such that f(x, u′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ is subterm
of either vi′ or EℓApδ(Σℓ) for some ℓ ∈ I. We do case analysis on these two cases.
Case f(x, u′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ ∈ st(vi′ ): By Definition 36, we know that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . ,N} such
that i′ ≤ k and k < N and:
either k < D ∪ H and vi = Apδ(uk);
or k ∈ D ∪ D and vi = Apδ(tEkΣk).
By Definition 32, it implies that there exists t′, t′′ subterm of Φ such that f(x, u′
1
, . . . , u′n)σ = Apδ(t
′′)
with t′′ = f(t′,w1, . . . ,wℓ), Apδ(t
′) = t and for all r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Apδ(wr) = u
′
rσ. However, since for
all r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, u′r ∈ T (Fkey,X) then it implies that for all y ∈ dom(σ), there exists a term w such
that Apδ(w) = yσ. Let us define the substitution σ
′ such that for all y ∈ dom(σ), yσ′ = w where
Apδ(w) = yσ. Since we also have that for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, v
′
1
, . . . , v′r ∈ T (Fkey,X) then we deduce
that for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Apδ(v
′
rσ
′) = v′rσ. By applying our inductive hypothesis on Apδ(t
′′) and
Apδ(v
′
1
σ′), . . . ,Apδ(v
′
k
σ′), we deduce that Φ ⊢ t′′ and for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Φ ⊢ v′rσ
′. Thus it allows
us to apply the same decomposition rule and conclude that Φ ⊢ t′.
Therefore, we have shown that there exists t′ such that names(t′)∩img(δ) = ∅, Apδ(t
′) = t andΦ ⊢
t′. Note that since names(t′)∩ img(δ) = ∅, if there exists another t′′ such that names(t′′)∩ img(δ) = ∅
and Apδ(t
′′) = t, then t′′ = t′. Therefore the result holds. Moreover, if there exists r ∈ I and a
position p of Er such that ErApδ(Σr)|p = t then by Lemma 35, we deduce that ErΣr |p = t
′ and so
Φ ⊢ ErΣr |p = t
′ which allows us to conclude.
Case f(x, u′
1
, . . . , u′n)σ ∈ st(EℓApδ(Σℓ)) for ℓ ∈ I: If there is no position p of Eℓ different from a
variable such that EℓApδ(Σℓ)|p = f(x, u
′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ then it implies that there exists x ∈ Σℓ such that
f(x, u′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ ∈ Apδ(xΣℓ). Thus, we can apply the same reasoning as in the case f(x, u
′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ ∈
st(vi′ ) which allows us to conclude.
Let us consider the case where there exists a position p of Eℓ different from a variable such that
EcℓApδ(Σℓ)|p = f(x, u
′
1
, . . . , u′
ℓ
)σ. We build a substitution σ′ as follows:
By Definition 5, we know that for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if v′r < X then for all r
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n},
vars(u′r′) = vars(v
′
r) = {x} implies Ecℓ|p·(r′+1) ∈ X. Thus, we define in such a case xσ
′ such that
u′r′σ
′ = Ecℓ|p·(r′+1)Σℓ. It implies that u
′
rσ = Apδ(u
′
rσ
′) and v′rσ = Apδ(v
′
rσ
′).
Otherwise, if v′r ∈ X then either there exists r
′ such that u′r′ = v
′
r or u
′
r′ = g(v
′
r) for some g ∈ Fkey.
In the former, it implies that v′rσ = EℓApδ(Σℓ)|p·(r′+1) where p · (r
′ + 1) is a position of Eℓ. Thus we
define u′r′σ
′ = EℓΣℓ |p·(r′+1). In the latter, by Definition 5, we deduce that there exists t
′ such that
v′rσ = Apδ(t
′) and so u′r′σ = Apδ(g(t
′)). By Lemma 35, we deduce thus that EℓΣℓ|p·(r′+1) = g(t
′) and
we define v′rσ
′ = t′.
We can therefore apply our inductive hypothesis on EcℓApδ(Σℓ)|p, v
′
1
σ, . . . , v′mσ which allows us
to deduce that Φ ⊢ EℓΣℓ |p = f(xσ
′, u′
1
σ′, . . . , u′nσ
′) and for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Φ ⊢ v′rσ
′. Thus we can
apply the same decomposition rule and obtain that Φ ⊢ EℓΣℓ|p·1.
Let us conclude by verifying the two hypothesis: if there exists t′ such that Apδ(t
′) = t then
by Lemma 35, we deduce that t′ = EℓΣℓ |p·1 and so the result holds. If there exists ℓ
′ ∈ I and a
position p′ of Eℓ′ such that t = Eℓ′Apδ(Σℓ′ )|p′ , then we obtain that Eℓ′Apδ(Σℓ′ ) = EℓApδ(Σℓ)|p·1 with
Φ ⊢ EℓΣℓ|p·1. Therefore, we can apply the same reasoning as in he base case M(P) = (i, 1) and
t = EkApδ(Σk) = E jApδ(Σ j)|p with Φ ⊢ EkΣk. This allows us to conclude. ◭
◮ Lemma 40. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint
sets such that I = D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. Assume that Φ is a
well formed frame for S, D, N and H. Let I′ ⊆ I such that for all i ∈ I′, TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢
tEiApδ(Σi). For all t ∈ T (F ,N), Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ t implies Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ t.
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Proof. Let t ∈ T (F ,N) such that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ t. We prove the result by induction on
|I′|.
Base case |I′| = 0: Trivial.
Inductive case |I′| > 0: Let k ∈ I′, we do a case analysis on k.
Case k ∈ D: By Definition 36, we know that tEkApδ(Σk) ∈ Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ). Thus, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ)·[tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢
t implies that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′r{k} ⊢ t. By our inductive hypothesis on I
′
r {k}, we deduce
that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ t.
Case k ∈ N: In such a case, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ)·[EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk) implies Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ)·[EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢
tEkApδ(Σk). By Lemma 37, we know that for all names a ∈ img(δ) ∩ names(tEkApδ(Σk)), for all
term u, u ∈ dom(δ) and uδ = a implies Φ ⊢ u. Thus, if we denote A = {a ∈ img(δ) | u ∈
dom(δ), uδ = a,Φ ⊢ u}, we deduce that names(tEkApδ(Σk)) ∩ (img(δ) r A) = ∅. Therefore, by
Lemma 39, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk) implies that Φ ⊢ tEkΣk. This is a contradiction
with the fact that Φ is a well formed frame for S, D, N and H. Hence this case is impossible.
Case k ∈ H and (Ek,Fk) allows authentic channels: This case is similar to the case k ∈ D since
tEkApδ(Σk) ∈ Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) by Definition 36.
Case k ∈ H and (Ek,Fk) does not allow authentic channels: In such a case, (Ek,Fk) satisfies Prop-
erty 4 of Definition 7. Thus, TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk) implies that either Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ·
[tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′r{k} ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk) or there exists x ∈ XEk such that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′r{k} ⊢
xApδ(Σk). In the latter, by inductive hypothesis on I r {k}, we would deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢
xApδ(Σk) which is in contradiction with the fact that Φ is a well formed frame for S, D, N and
H. Hence we deduce that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′r{k} ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk). By applying our inductive
hypothesis on I′ r {k}, we deduce that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ tEkApδ(Σk). Thus, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′ ⊢ t
implies that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [tEiApδ(Σi)]i∈I′r{k} ⊢ t. By our inductive hypothesis on I
′
r {k}, we deduce
that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ t.
◭
◮ Lemma 41. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint
sets such that D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. Assume that Φ is a well
formed frame for S, D, N and H. Let us denote I = D ∪ N ∪ H. The following two properties hold:
for all terms t, names(t) ∩ img(δ) = ∅ and Φ ⊢ t imply Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t)
for all i ∈ I, for all positions p of Ei, if Φ ⊢P Ei(t
i, si
1
, . . . , si
ℓi
)|p then the term EiApδ(Σi)|p is
deducible from the frame Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I .
Proof. Let a term t such that names(t)∩ img(δ) = ∅ andΦ ⊢P t. Consider that P is minimal. We will
prove both properties by induction onM(P). In particular, for the second property, we will assume
that t = EiΣi|p for some i ∈ I and position p of Ei. Let us denote Φ = [w1; . . . ;wn].
Base case M(P) = (0, 1): In such a case, P = 0 and so t ∈ ND or t ∈ Fcst. Therefore, we deduce
that Apδ(t) = t and so Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t). Regarding the second property, if there exists i ∈ I and
a position p of Ei such that EiΣi|p = t then either Ei|p ∈ X ∪ Fcst. In such a case, we deduce that
EiApδ(Σi)|p = t and so the result holds since Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ t.
Base caseM(P) = (i, 1): In such a case, P = i and so t = wi. We do a case analysis whether i ∈ I or
not.
Case i < I: By Definition 36, we know that there exists j ≤ i such that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ j Apδ(t). Thus
the first property directly holds. Regarding the second property, assume that there exists j ∈ I and
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a position p of E j such that t = E jΣ j|p. By Lemma 34, we know that E jΣ j = C[u1, . . . , um] where
C[_] is a context built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst and for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, uk is either a tagA-term of dom(δ)
or uk ∈ vars(Ei)Σi or a term of the form f(v) for some f ∈ Fkey and v ∈ XEiΣi ∪ Fcst. We know that
Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t). Hence, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if uk is not a tagA-term of dom(δ), it implies that
Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(uk). If uk is a tagA-term of dom(δ), we know by Definition 28 that there exists P
′ such
that M(P′) < (i, 1) and Φ ⊢P′ uk. Moreover, there exists a position p
′ of E j such that uk = E jΣ j|p′
hence we can apply our inductive hypothesis on it which means that by combining both results, the
result holds.
Case i ∈ I: In such case, by Lemma 34, we know that EiΣi = C[u1, . . . , um] where C[_] is a
context built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst and for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, uk is either a tagA-term of dom(δ) or ui ∈
vars(Ei)Σi or a term of the form f(v) for some f ∈ Fkey and v ∈ XEiΣi ∪ Fcst. Since t = wi, it
implies that for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Φ ⊢ uk. But by Definition 7 and in particular by Property 1 using
the empty frame, we can deduce that for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, uk is either a tagA-term of dom(δ) or
uk ∈ {tEiΣi} ∪ T (Fkey ∪ Fcst, ∅). Moreover, by Property 4 of Definition 7 and by Definition 38, we
deduce that uk can only be either a tagA-term of dom(δ) or uk ∈ T (Fkey∪Fcst, ∅) when i ∈ D or when
(Ei,Fi) does not allow authentic channels.
Furthermore, if (Ei,Fi) is an encapsulation allowing authentic channels, we know that by Defin-
ition 36 that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ tEiApδ(Σi). Since by Lemma 34, we have Apδ(t) = C[Apδ(u1), . . . ,Apδ(um)]
and Apδ(u1) . . . ,Apδ(um) ∈ ND ∪ {tEiApδ(Σi)} ∪ T (Fkey ∪ Fcst, ∅), we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t).
Let us focus now on the second property. Assume that there exists j ∈ I and a position p of
E j such that t = E jΣ j|p. If E j|p ∈ X then we have that Apδ(t) = E jApδ(Σ j)|p. But we already
proved that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t) hence the result directly holds. If E j|p < X then in such a case,
E jΣ j|p = EiΣi implies that E j|p is unifiable with Ei. Let us consider the E j|p. We know by definition
that E j|p = C
′[r1, . . . , rℓ] where C
′ is built on pair for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, rk ∈ T (Fkey,X) or rk is
a tagA-term. In the former, since Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t), we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(rkΣ j). In the
latter, if q is the position of rk in E j and q is also a position of Ei different from a variable, then
by Property 2 of Definition 5, we deduce that E jApδ(Σ j)|p·q = EiApδ(Σi)|q. Therefore, we have that
Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ rkApδ(Σ j). Otherwise by Definition 28, we know that there exists a proof
Q such thatM(Q) < (i, 1) and Φ ⊢Q rkΣ j. Thus we can apply our inductive hypothesis on it which
allows us to deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ rkApδ(Σ j). And so the result holds.
Inductive caseM(P) = (i, j) with j > 1: Let us do a case analysis on the last rule of the proof.
Assume first that the last rule of the proof is an f-composition rule. Therefore, there exists
t1, . . . , tm and ir such that t = f(t1, . . . , tm), P = ir(P1, . . . , Pm) and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Φ ⊢Pi ti.
If t ∈ dom(δ) then Apδ(t) ∈ ND and so we directly have Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t). Else t < dom(δ) and
since for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, M(Pi) < M(P) then by inductive hypothesis on all the ti, we deduce
that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(ti). Moreover, thanks to t < dom(δ), we know that
Apδ(t) = f(Apδ(t1), . . . ,Apδ(tm)). Hence we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t). Consider now that there
exists r ∈ I and a position p of Er such that t = ErΣr . If Er |p ∈ X then Apδ(t) = ErApδ(Σr)|p.
Therefore, we directly have that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t) as previously shown and so the result holds. If
Er |p < X then we can apply our inductive hypothesis on all tk with position p · k and so the result
also holds.
Assume now that the last rule is an f-decomposition. Therefore, there exists x ∈ X, u1, . . . , um, v1,
. . . , vk ∈ T (Fkey,X), a substitution σ and some proofs P
′, P1, . . . , Pk such that:
t = xσ
vars(v1, . . . , vk) ⊆ {u1, . . . , um}; and
P = ir(P′, P1, . . . , Pk); and
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Φ ⊢P′ f(x, u1, . . . , um)σ and for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Φ ⊢Pr vrσ.
Moreover, by minimality of P, we know that there exists i′ ≤ i such that P is a successive sequence
of applications of decomposition rules on wi′ . We do a case analysis on f(x, u1, . . . , um)σ and i
′.
Case f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ ∈ dom(δ) and i
′
< I: Since P is a successive sequence of applications of
decomposition rules onwi′ , we deduce that there exists a position p such that wi′ |p = f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ
and (i′, 1) ≤ M(P′) < (i, j). But by Definition 28, we know that either [w1; . . . ;wi′−1] ⊢ wi′ |p or else
p = p′ · a · p′′ such that [w1; . . . ;wi′−1] ⊢ wi′ |p′ ·a. Moreover, P being a successive sequence of
applications of decomposition rules on wi′ implies that there exists P
′′ ∈ st(P) such that (i′, 1) ≤
M(P′′) and Φ ⊢P′′ wi′ |p′ ·a. Since we already know that [w1; . . . ;wi′−1] ⊢ wi′ |p′ ·a then there is a
contradiction with the fact that P is minimal.
Case f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ ∈ dom(δ), i
′ ∈ I and f(x, u1, . . . , unσ) ∈ st(Σi′ ): Similar to the previous
case, meaning that we obtain a contradiction with the fact that P is minimal.
Case t ∈ dom(δ) and either i′ < I or t ∈ st(Σi′ ): Similar to the previous case.
For the next cases, we need to look at different cases depending on the property we prove.
Moreover, we have to switch from one property to the other depending on the case.
Property 1 Case f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ < dom(δ): In such a case, we have Apδ(f(xσ, u1σ, . . . , unσ)) =
f(Apδ(xσ),Apδ(u1σ), . . . ,Apδ(umσ)). By our inductive hypothesis, we deduce Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ f(Apδ(xσ),
Apδ(u1σ), . . . ,Apδ(umσ)) and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(viσ). But u1σ, . . . , umσ, v1σ, . . . ,
vkσ ∈ T (Fkey,X), hence we deduce that for all i, Apδ(uiσ) = uiApσ(σ) and Apδ(viσ) = viApσ(σ).
This allows us to deduce that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(xσ).
Property 2 Case for all k ∈ I and all positions p of Ek, EkΣk |p , f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ : In such
a case, we deduce that i′ < I. However, we know that there exists k ∈ I and a position p of Ek
such that EkΣk |p = t. Therefore, by Lemma 34, we deduce that t = C[u
′
1
, . . . , u′n′] such that for all
r ∈ {1, . . . , n′}, either u′r is a tagA-term or u
′
r ∈ vars(Ek)Σk or u
′
r is of the form f(v) for some f ∈ Fkey
and some v ∈ XEkΣk ∪ Fcst. From the previous case, we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t) and so for all
r ∈ {1, . . . , n′}, Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(u
′
r). But by Lemma 34, we know that EkApδ(Σk)|p = C[v
′
1
, . . . , v′n′]
such that for all r ∈ r ∈ {1, . . . , n′}, if u′r is not a tagA-term then v
′
r = Apδ(u
′
r). Moreover, if u
′
r is
a tagA-term then by Definition 28, we know [w1; . . . ;wi′−1] ⊢ u
′
r. We also know that there exists
a position p′ of Ek such that EkΣk |p′ = u
′
r. Hence we can apply our inductive hypothesis on u
′
r
and obtain that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ EkApδ(Σk)|p′ . By combining the two cases (u
′
r being a
tagA-term or not), we deduce that the term EkApδ(Σk)|p is deducible from Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I .
Property 2 Case there exists k ∈ I and a position p of Ek such that EkΣk |p = f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ: We
can apply our inductive hypothesis on f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ which allows us to deduce that EkApδ(Σk)|p
is deducible from Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I . We show that we can apply the same rule ir. Let us look
at the terms v1, . . . , vm′ and construct a new substitution σ
′. For all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m′}, by Definition 5
either vr = g(x) for some x ∈ X, g ∈ Fkey and for all r
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if x ∈ vars(ur′) then ur′σ ∈
vars(Ek)Σk ∪ Fcst. Therefore, for all r
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if x ∈ vars(ur′) then EkApδ(Σk)|p·(r′+1) =
Apδ(ur′σ). Therefore, we define xσ
′ = Apδ(xσ). Note that in such a case, Apδ(vrσ) = vrσ
′.
Moreover, since Φ ⊢Pr vrσ then by our inductive hypothesis, we have that Tr
δ,Φ
ID ,IH
(⊢)Apδ(vrσ) and
so TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ vrσ
′.
or vr ∈ X and for all r
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if vr ∈ vars(ur′) then ur′σ = vrσ. In such a case, we define
vrσ
′ = EkApδ(Σk)|p·(r′+1). Note that since Φ ⊢Pr vrσ, we can apply our inductive hypothesis on
vrσ and the position p · (r
′ + 1) which indicates that the term vrσ
′ is deducible from the frame
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I .
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or vr ∈ X and there exists r
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n) such that vr ∈ vars(ur′) and ur′σ = g(v) with g ∈ Fkey
and v ∈ XEkΣk ∪ Fcst. In such a case, we define vrσ
′ = Apδ(v). Similarly to the first case, we
deduce Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ vrσ
′.
This allows us to conclude that f(x, u1, . . . , um)σ
′ = EkApδ(Σk)|p and Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢
vrσ
′ for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m′}. Therefore, we conclude that EkApδ(Σk)|p·1 is deducible from Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ·
[EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I .
Property 1 Case f(x, u1, . . . , un)σ ∈ dom(δ): Considering all the different cases we went through,
it implies that i′ ∈ I and there exists a position p of Ei′ such that Ei′Σi′ |p = t. Therefore, by
Lemma 34, we know that t = C[d1, . . . , dk] where C is a context built on {〈_〉} ∪ Fcst and for all r ∈
{1, . . . , k}, dr is either a tagA-term or dr ∈ vars(Ei′ )Σi′ or dr = g(v) with g ∈ Fkey or v ∈ XEi′Σi′ ∪Fcst.
By applying Property 2 on t, we deduce that for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if dr is not a tagA-term then Apδ(dr)
is deducible from Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I . Let us consider the different cases:
if dr ∈ T (Fkey ∪ Fcst,XEi′Σi′ ) then by Property 1 of Definition 7 and Lemma 40, we deduce that
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(dr).
if dr = tEi′Σi′ and i
′ ∈ N then this case is in fact impossible since Φ ⊢ t implies Φ ⊢ ti
′
which is a
contradiction with Definition 38.
if dr = tEi′Σi′ and i
′ ∈ D or (Ei′ ,Fi′ ) is an encapsulation allowing authentic channels, then by
Definition 36, we know that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(dr)
if dr = tEi′Σi′ and i
′ ∈ H and (Ei′ ,Fi′) is an not encapsulation allowing authentic channels, then
by Property 4 of Definition 7 and Lemma 40, either Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(dr) or there exists x ∈ XEi′
such that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ xApδ(Σi′ ). But the latter case contradicts our initial hypothesis given in
Definition 38. Therefore, we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(dr).
Lastly, for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if dr is a tagA-term then Apδ(dr) ∈ ND and so we trivially have that
Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ dr. This allows us to conclude that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ C[Apδ(d1), . . . ,Apδ(dk)] and so Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢
Apδ(t). ◭
◮ Lemma 42. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint
sets such that D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let δ be a tagA-mapping of Φ. Assume that Φ is a well
formed frame for S, D, N and H. Let us denote I = D ∪ N ∪ H.
For all (E,F) ∈ S, for all substitution Σ, for all position p of E, if Φ ⊢ EΣ|p then there exists
a context C[_, . . . , _] and some terms u1, . . . , un such that EΣ|p = C[u1, . . . , un] and for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢ ui and if q is position of ui in EΣ|p then p · q is a position of E and
either E|p·q ∈ X;
or E|p·q = f(x) with f ∈ Fkey and x ∈ XE ∪ Fcst;
or E|p·q is a tagA-tagged term and there exists k ∈ I and a position q
′ of Ek such that Ek |q′ < X
and ui = EkΣk |q′ .
Proof. Let us denote Φ = [w1; . . . ;w|Φ|]. Consider the minimal proof P such that Φ ⊢P EΣ|p. We
prove the result by induction onM(P).
Base case P = (0, 1): In such a case, EΣ|p ∈ ND ∪ Fcst. Thus it necessarily implies that E|p ∈ X.
Hence the result holds with C = _.
Inductive case P = (i, j) and the last rule of P is a decomposition: In such a case, we deduce that
there exists k ≤ i such that EΣ|p ∈ st(wk).
By Definition 5, we know that there exists a context C[_, . . . , _] built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst and some
terms v1, . . . , vn such that E|p = C[v1, . . . , vn] and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either vi is a tagA-term or
42 Secure refinements of communication channels
vi ∈ X or vi = f(x) for some f ∈ Fkey and x ∈ XE ∪ Fcst. Therefore, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, thanks to the
fact that C[_, . . . , _] is built on {〈 〉} ∪ Fcst, we deduce that Φ ⊢ viΣ. If vi is a tagA-tagged term then
we do a small case analysis on k.
Case k ∈ I and there exists a position q′ of Ek such that Ek |
′
q < X and vi = EkΣk |q′ : Trivial
Case k < I or Ek |q′ ∈ X: In such a case, viΣ being a tagA-term implies thanks to Definition 28,
we deduce that either there exist k′ ∈ I and a position q′′ of Ek′ different from a variable such that
viΣ = Ek′ |q′′Σk or [w1; . . . ;wk−1] ⊢ viΣ. In the former, the result directly holds. In the latter, we can
apply our inductive hypothesis on viΣ since k − 1 < i which allows us to deduce the existence of
a context Ci and terms u
i
1
, . . . , uini satisfying the correct properties. In such a case, we can directly
conclude with the contextC[C1, . . . ,Cn] whereCk = _ in the case where uk is not a tagA-tagged term
else the context Ck obtained through the inductive hypothesis.
Inductive case P = (i, j) with the last rule of P being a composition: In such a case, EΣ|p =
f(t1, . . . , tn) where for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢ tk. If E|p ∈ X the result directly holds. Else for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, p · k is a position E. Therefore, we can apply our inductive hypothesis on tk and so we
deduce the existence of a contextCk and terms u
k
1
, . . . , ukmk satisfying the correct properties. In such a
case, we can directly conclude with the context f[C1, . . . ,Cn] and the terms u
1
1
, . . . , u1n1 , . . . , u
n
mn
. ◭
◮ Lemma 43. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a frame. Let D, N, H be three disjoint
sets such that I = D ∪ N ∪ H ⊆ {1, . . . , |Φ|}. Let (E,F) ∈ S. Let Σ be a ground substitution. Let δ be
a tagA-mapping of Φ · [EΣ]. Assume that Φ is a well formed frame for S, D, N and H.
If Φ ⊢ EΣ and (E,F) allows confidential channels then
either there exists k ∈ H such that Ek ∼ E and EkΣk = EΣ;
or Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ).
If Φ ⊢ EΣ; and for all i ∈ H, either XEiΣi = XEΣ or XEiΣi ∩ XEΣ = ∅; and (E,F) does not allow
confidential channels then
if there exists k ∈ H such that XEkApδ(Σk) = XEApδ(Σ) then there exist k ∈ H such that Ek ∼ E
and EkΣk = EΣ;
if for all k ∈ H, XEkApδ(Σk) ∩ XEApδ(Σ) = ∅ then Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ).
Proof. W.l.o.g. consider that the variable of (E,F) are disjoint from the variables of (Ek,Fk) for all
k ∈ I. By Lemma 42, we know that there exists a context C[_, . . . , _] and some terms u1, . . . , un
such that EΣ = C[u1, . . . , un] and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Φ ⊢ ui if p is position of ui in EΣ then p is a
position of E and
either E|p ∈ X;
or E|p = f(x) with f ∈ Fkey and x ∈ XE ∪ Fcst;
or E|p is a tagA-tagged term and there exists k ∈ I and a position q of Ek such that Ek|q < X and
ui = EkΣk |q.
Let us first prove that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ EApδ(Σ). Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let us denote by
p is position of ui in EΣ. If E|p ∈ X then by Lemma 41, Φ ⊢ ui implies that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(E|pΣ) =
E|pApδ(Σ). Similarly, if E|p = f(x) with f ∈ Fkey and x ∈ XE ∪ Fcst then we deduce that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢
E|pApδ(Σ).
Otherwise E|p is a tagA-tagged term and there exist k ∈ I and a position q of Ek such that
Ek|q < X and ui = EkΣk |q. But E|pΣ = Ek |qΣk implies that E|p and Ek |q are unifiable. Therefore,
by Property 2 of Definition 7, we deduce that img(mgu(Ek|q,E|p)) ⊆ X. Therefore, Ek |qΣk = E|pΣ
implies Ek|qApδ(Σk) = E|pApδ(Σ). But we know that Φ ⊢ E|pΣ and so Φ ⊢ Ek |qΣk. Hence by
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Lemma 41, we deduce that TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ Ek|qApδ(Σk). This allows us to deduce that
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢ E|pApδ(Σ). This allows us to conclude that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) · [EkApδ(Σk)]k∈I ⊢
EApδ(Σ).
By applying Property 5 of Definition 7 and Lemma 40, we deduce that if (E,F) allows confiden-
tial channels then:
either there exists j ∈ I such that E j ∼ E and E jApδ(Σ j) = EApδ(Σ); If j ∈ H then the result
holds. Else j ∈ N ∪ D. But in both cases, tE jApδ(Σ j) ∈ Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ). Hence we deduce that
Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ).
or Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ) which implies Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ)
This allows us to conclude when (E,F) allows confidential channels.
By applying Property 6 of Definition 7 and Lemma 40, we deduce that if (E,F) does not allow
confidential channels then:
either there exists j ∈ I such that E j ∼ E and E jApδ(Σ j) = EApδ(Σ). Hence the result holds.
or there exists x ∈ XE such that Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ xApδ(Σ) and Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ). Hence the result
holds
or there exists j ∈ I, y ∈ XE ∩ XE j , x ∈ XE such that yΣ = yΣ j, tEApδ(Σ) = tE jApδ(Σ j) and
TrH,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ xApδ(Σ). But by hypothesis, we know that for all i ∈ H, either XEiΣi = XEΣ or
XEiΣi ∩ XEΣ = ∅. In such a case, by Definition 38 and since Tr
H,δ
D,N
(Φ) ⊢ xApδ(Σ), we deduce that
j < H. Therefore, by definition of TrH,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ), we deduce that TrH,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ tEApδ(Σ).
◭
C.4 From the composed protocol to the abstract protocol (New)
The events added to a process P when created an annotation P˜ under a mapping ρ (Definition 9)
contain sufficient information to express when P˜ is a secure channel establishment protocol (Defin-
ition 16). However, the channels in the events of P˜ are public since they are not restricted by any
new operator. For the proof of Theorem 17, we need to link these public channels with the ab-
stract channels actually restricted in the context of Q. Therefore, we consider below new events
e˜v1, . . . , e˜vn, . . . of arity 5 in which the last elements will be used to “store" the abstract channels
actually restricted in the context of Q. Let us denote E˜v = {e˜v1, . . . , e˜vn, . . .}. Considering these new
events, we also define a notion of process secure similar to Definition 16.
◮ Definition 44. Let P be a closed process. We say that P is secure when for all (P, ∅, ∅,
)
=⇒
e1 · . . . · em(P
′,Φ′, µ′, θ′), for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if ei = ev(c, ta, (s1, . . . , sℓ), (u1, . . . , uq), d) such that
ev ∈ E˜v and all agents in ta are honest then for all k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, Φ′ 0 sk and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , q},
Φ′ ⊢ uk. Moreover, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if e j = ev
′(c′, ta′, (s′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
), (u′
1
, . . . , u′q′), d
′) for some
channel c′, d′, some tuple ta′ of agents and some tuples (s′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
) and (u′
1
, . . . , u′q′) of terms then
either ta , ta′ or c , c′ or ev = ev′ implies ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},∀k′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ′}, sk , s
′
k′
or one of the two following properties is satisfied :
(s1, . . . , sℓ) = (s
′
1
, . . . , s′
ℓ′
) and (u1, . . . , uq) = (u
′
1
, . . . , u′q′).
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},∀k′ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ′}, sk , s
′
k′
.
Note that the definition is almost identical of Definition 16. The only difference is that we
consider events from E˜v instead of the events {ev1, . . . , evn, . . .}.
We also define a property on the trace linking the two channels of the events from E˜v.
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◮Definition 45. Let P be a closed process. We say that an execution (P, ∅, ∅, ∅)
e1·...·em
====⇒ (P′,Φ′, µ′, θ′)
is well formed if for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if ei = ev(c, ta, ts, tp, d), e j = ev
′(c, ta, ts, tp, d′), ev, ev′ ∈
E˜v, the agents of ta are honest, ev , ev′ and d , d′ for some c, ta, ts, tp, d, d′, ev, ev′ then
either there exists i′ < i such that ei′ = ev(c, ta, ts, tp, d
′′) for some d′′ , d;
or there exists j′ < j such that e j′ = ev
′(c, tq, ts, tp, d′′) for some d′′ , d′.
◮ Lemma 46. Let S be a set of channels. Let P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn] be a closed process such that:
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if c ∈ S appears in Ri then it can only be inside an unique event e˜vi(d, ta, ts, tp, c)
for some d, ta, ts, tp where A ∈ ta, A is the agent of Ri and newta c is in C.
there exists a bijective mapping γ from S to fresh channels for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all e˜vi(d, ta, ts, tp, c)
in Ri, cγ = d.
For all (P, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr
=⇒ (Q,Φ, µ, θ), there exists Q′, θ′, tr′ such that (P, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr′
=⇒ (Q′,Φ, µ, θ′) and this
configuration is well formed.
Proof. Consider (P, ∅, ∅, ∅)
e1·...·en
====⇒ (Q,Φ, µ, θ). Since the channels of S only appear in the events of
P, the choices of channels during the execution of the rule New-c do not affect the execution of the
trace other than the value of the channels in e1 · . . . · en. Let us create a partition ⊎
m
j=1
I j of {1, . . . , n}
such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, for all k, k′ ∈ I j, the fifth argument of e
′
k
and e′
k′
have been instantiated
by the same execution of the rule New-c, for all k ∈ I j for all k ∈ I j′ with j , j
′, the fifth argument
of e′
k
and e′
k′
have been instantiated by two different execution of the rule New-c. This allows us
to build recursively θ′ on the m, i.e. on the order of execution of the rule New-c. Typically, when
two events (evi(d, ta, ts, tp, c) and ev j(d
′, ta′, ts′, tp′, c′)) of the same partition, meaning i , j satisfy
ta = ta′ and d = d′ then we select the same channels if (ts, tp) = (ts′, tp′). ◭
Let us denote by Tt the set of tuples of terms.
◮ Definition 47. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. We say that P is an initial process when for
all instances outA(c, u) (resp. inA(c, u)) in P,
either u is a fully tagB-tagged term;
or c = cpub and u = EΣ for some fully tagB-tagged substitution Σ and some encapsulation
(E,F) ∈ S.
Let us denote by channelsO/I(P) the set of channels appearing in an output or input of P. Note
that channels(P)rchannelsO/I(P) is not necessary empty since a channel c can be declared by new c
in P but never used in an output or input.
◮ Definition 48. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be an executed ground frame for S
and some I. Let P be an initial process. Let α be a mapping from S × Tt to Ch. We say that α is
a mapping of channels for P (resp. Φ) when img(α) ∩ channelsO/I(P) = ∅ and for all (E,F) ∈ S,
for all substitution Σ, if EΣ is in P (resp. for all i ∈ I, if EΣ = EiΣi) then there exists c ∈ Ch
such that ((E,F),XEΣ)α = c and if (E,F) allows authentic (resp. confidential, secure) channels then
c ∈ Cha ∪ Chp (resp. Chc ∪ Chp, Chs ∪ Chp).
We define the transformed process of P w.r.t. α, denoted Trα(P), as the process P where we
replace:
all instances outAi(cpub,EΣ) by outAi (c, tEΣ)
all instances inAi (cpub,EΣ) by inAi(c, tEΣ)
when ((E,F),XEΣ)α = c for some Σ and F.
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◮ Definition 49. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be an ground executed frame for
some set I. Let P be an initial process. Let α (resp. β) be a mapping of channels for P (resp. Φ). Let
σ a substitution of closed terms. Let tr be a sequence of closed events. We say that P,Φ, α, β, tr and
σ have conforming events if
1. for all i ∈ I, there exist c, d, ta, k such that ((Ei,Fi),XEiΣi)β = d, e˜vk(c, ta,XEiΣi,FiΣi, d) ∈ tr and
d < Chp is equivalent to all agents in ta are honest; and
2. for all roles R = r1. . . . .rn of P, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if ri = outA(cpub,EΣ) (resp. ri =
inA(cpub,EΣ)) for some agent A, some substitution Σ and some encapsulation (E,F) ∈ S then
there exists c, d, ta such that ((E,F),XEΣ)α = d and:
either there exist j < i and ev ∈ E˜v such that r j = eventA(ev(c, ta,XEΣ,FΣ), d);
or ev(c, ta,XEΣσ,FΣσ, d) ∈ tr and d < Chp is equivalent to all agents in ta are honest.
When tr and Φ are the empty sequence and σ is the identity, we say that P, α have conforming
events.
◮ Definition 50. Let S be a set of tagA-encapsulations. Let Φ be a well formed frame for S and
some D,N and H. Let β be a mapping of channels for Φ. We define µ(Φ, β) as a mapping from
channels to sets of terms such that:
dom(µ(Φ, β)) = {c < Chp | i ∈ H ∧ ((Ei,Fi),XEiΣi)β = c}; and
∀c ∈ dom(µ(Φ, β)), cµ(Φ, β) = {Apδ(tEiΣi) | i ∈ H ∧ ((Ei,Fi),XEiΣi)β = c}.
◮ Lemma 51. Let S be a set of tagA-tagged encapsulations allowing authentic, confidential and
secure channels. Let P0 be a closed initial process. Let α0 be a mapping of channels for P0. Assume
that P0,α0 have conforming events. Assume that (Trα(P0), ∅, ∅, ∅) is secure. For all well-formed
execution (P0, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr
=⇒σ (P,Φ, µ, θ), there exists an initial process Q, a mapping of channels α
(resp. β) for Q (resp. Φ), and η, δ, D, N and H such that:
Qσ = P; and
ησ = µ and η only contains fully tagB-terms; and
Q, Φ, α, β, tr and σ have conforming events; and
Φ is a well formed frame for S, D, N and H; and
σ is an executed substitution for Φ; and
δ is a tagA-mapping of Φ and σ; and
(Trα(P0), ∅, ∅, ∅)
Apδ(tr)
====⇒Apδ(σ) (Trα(Q)Apδ(σ),Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ), ηApδ(σ) ◦ µ(Φ, β), θ)
Proof. We do the proof by induction on the size of the trace (P0, ∅, id)
tr
=⇒σ (P,Φ, µ):
Base case: The result trivially holds with Q = P0, α = α0, β = id, δ = id, D = N = H = ∅.
Inductive step: In such case, we assume that there exist two processes P1 and P2, two substitu-
tions σ1, σ2, two frames Φ1,Φ2 and two mapping µ1, µ2 such that (P0, ∅, id)
tr1
=⇒σ1 (P1,Φ1, µ1)
e
−→σ2
(P2,Φ2, µ2). By applying our inductive hypothesis on (P0, ∅, id)
tr1
=⇒σ1 (P1,Φ1, µ1), we deduce that
there exist an initial process Q1, a mapping of channels α1 (resp. β1) for Q1 (resp. Φ1), and η1, δ1,
D1, N1, H1 such that:
Q1σ1 = P1; and
η1σ1 = µ1 and η1 only contains fully tagB-terms; and
Q1, Φ1, α1, β1, tr1 and σ1 have conforming events; and
Φ1 is a well formed frame for S, D1, N1 and H1; and
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σ1 is an executed substitution for Φ1; and
δ1 is a tagA-mapping of Φ1 and σ1; and
(Trα(P0), ∅, id)
Apδ1
(tr1)
=====⇒σ′
1
(Trα1(Q1)σ
′
1
,Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1), η1σ
′
1
◦ µ(Φ1, β1)) with σ
′
1
= Apδ1 (σ1).
We show the existence of an initial process Q2, a mapping of channels α2 (resp. β2) for Q2 (resp.
Φ2), and η2, δ2, D2, N2 and H2 satisfying the result with (P2,Φ2, µ2) by case analysis on the rule
applying in (P1,Φ1, µ1)
e
−→σ2 (P2,Φ2, µ2).
Rule Out: In such a case, Q1 = Q | outA(c, u).RA, P2 = Qσ1 | RAσ1, σ2 = σ1, Φ2 = Φ1 · [uσ1]
if c ∈ Chp ∪ Cha else Φ2 = Φ1, and µ2 = rect(c, uσ1, µ1) if c < Chp else µ2 = µ1. Let us first define
Q2 = Q | RA. This allows us to deduce that Q2σ2 = P2. Let us also define tr2 = tr1 and α2 = α1.
Therefore, we deduce that Trα2 (Q2) = Trα1 (Q1) | Trα1 (RA).
By Definition 47, we know that either u is a fully tagB-tagged term and c < img(α1)∪ img(β1) or
u = EΣ and c = cpub ∈ Chp where Σ is a fully tagB-tagged substitution and (E,F) is an encapsulation.
We do a case analysis:
Case u is a tagB-tagged term and c < img(α1) ∪ img(β1): In such a case, Trα1(Q1) = Trα1(Q) |
outA(c, u).Trα1 (RA). Since u is a tagB-tagged term, we deduce that Apδ1(uσ1) = uApδ1(σ1) thus
if µ2 = rect(c, uσ1, µ1) (when c < Chp) then we can define η2 = rect(c, u, η1) and obtain that
µ2 = η2σ1 = η2σ2 and η2Apδ2(σ2) = rect(c, uApδ1 (σ1), η1Apδ1(σ1)).
Consider N2 and D2 such that N2 ∪ D2 = N1 ∪ D1 and such that for all i ∈ N2 (resp. D2), Φ2 0 t
i
(resp. Φ2 ⊢ t
i). Consider H2 = H1, δ2 = δ1 and β2 = β1. In such a case, if Φ2 = Φ1 · [uσ1] (when
c ∈ Chp ∪ Cha) then we deduce that Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) = Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1) · [Apδ1(uσ1)] = Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1) ·
[uApδ1(σ1)]. This allows us to deduce that µ(Φ2, β2) = µ(Φ1, β1) and so:
(Trα1 (Q1)Apδ1(σ1),Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1), η1Apδ1(σ1) ◦ µ(Φ1, β1))
→
(Trα2 (Q2)Apδ2(σ2),Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2), η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ2, β2))
Moreover, since σ2 = σ1, tr1 = tr2, α2 = α2, β2 = β1, all outputs and inputs of P2 are in P1 and
N2 ∪ D2 ∪ H2 = N1 ∪ D1 ∪ H1, we deduce that P2,Φ2, α2, β2, tr2 and σ2 have conforming events.
Furthermore, we know that σ1 is an executed substitution for Φ1 and u is a tagB-tagged term. Hence
for all subterms of uσ1 that are tagA-tagged term, they are subterm of img(σ1). Hence following
Definitions 31 and 38, we deduce that Φ2 is a well formed frame for S, D2, N2 and H2. We also
directly have that σ2 is an executed substitution for Φ2 since Φ1 is included in Φ2. Lastly, since δ1
is a tagA-mapping of Φ1 and σ1 then we know that all tagA-tagged terms in img(σ1) are in dom(δ1),
thus so do the one in uσ1. Hence we deduce that δ2 is a tagA-mapping of Φ2 and σ2. This allows us
to conclude.
Case u = EΣ and c = cpub ∈ Chp: In this case, by Definition 49, we deduce that there exists a
channel d such that ((E,F),XEΣ)α1 = d. Let us show that if ((E,F),XEΣσ1)β1 = d
′ for some channel
d′ and either d < Chp or d
′
< Chp then d = d
′. By definition 48, we know that there exists i ∈
H1∪N1 ∪D1 such that (Ei,Fi) = (E,F), XEiΣiσ1 = XEΣσ1 and ((Ei,Fi),XEiΣi)β1 = d
′. Therefore, by
Definition 49, we know that there exists ev′ ∈ E˜v, c′
0
and ta′ such that ev′(c′
0
, ta′,XEiΣiσ1,FiΣiσ1, d
′) ∈
tr1 and all agents in ta
′ are honest is equivalent to d′ < Chp. Moreover, with the same definition,
we also know that there exists ev ∈ E˜v, c0 and ta such that ev(c0, ta,XEΣσ1,FΣσ1, d) ∈ tr1 and all
agents in ta are honest is equivalent to d < Chp. But we know that (Trα(P0), ∅, id) is secure. Hence
by our inductive hypothesis on (Trα(P0), ∅, id), if either d < Chp or d
′
< Chp then we deduce that all
the agents in either ta or ta′ are honest and thus since XEiΣiσ1 = XEΣσ1 we obtain by Definition 44
that ta = t
′
a, c0 = c
′
0
and ev , ev′. But we also know that the execution (P0, ∅, id)
tr
=⇒σ (P,Φ, µ) is well
formed. Hence by Definition 45, we deduce that d = d′. So XEiΣiσ1 = XEΣσ1 implies that d = d
′.
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Therefore, let us define β2 = β1 ◦ {((E,F),XEΣσ1) → d} if d < Chp or if ((E,F),XEΣσ1) < dom(β1).
Otherwise, we define β2 = β1.
Moreover, u = EΣ and c ∈ Chp imply Trα1(Q1) = Trα1(Q) | outA(d, tEΣ).Trα1(RA), Φ2 = Φ1 · [uσ1]
and µ2 = µ1. Therefore, by defining η2 = η1, we have that:
(Trα1(Q1)Apδ1(σ1),Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1), η1Apδ1(σ1) ◦ µ(Φ1, β1))
→
(Trα2 (Q2)Apδ2(σ2),Φ
′
2
, µ′
2
)
where Φ′
2
= Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1) · [tEΣApδ1 (σ1)] if d ∈ Chp ∪ Cha, else Φ
′
2
= Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1); and where
µ′
2
= rect(d, tEΣApδ1(σ1), η2Apδ2 (σ2) ◦ µ(Φ1, β1)) if d < Chp else µ
′
2
= η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ1, α1).
Note that tEΣ is a tagB-tagged term hence tEΣApδ1 (σ1) = Apδ1 (tEΣσ1). Moreover, we also directly
have that σ2 is an executed substitution for Φ2 since σ1 is an executed substitution for Φ1 and
Φ1 is included in Φ2. Furthermore, we know that Σ is a fully tagB-tagged substitution. Hence
for all subterms of Σσ1 that are tagA-tagged term, they are subterm of img(σ1). Hence following
Definitions 31 and 28, we deduce that Φ2 is an executed frame for S and D1 ∪ N1 ∪ H1 ∪ {|Φ1| + 1}.
Note that by construction of β2 and by Definition 49, we also deduce that P2, Φ2, α2, β2, tr2 and σ2
have conforming events. We do a small case analysis on d:
Case d ∈ Chp: In such a case, we define H2 = H1 and D2, N2 such that D2∪N2 = D1∪N1∪{|Φ1|+
1} and for all i ∈ N2 (resp. D2), Φ2 0 tEiΣi (resp. Φ2 ⊢ tEiΣi). Since δ1 = δ2 and σ1 = σ2 then
by Definition 36, we deduce that Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) = Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1) · [Apδ2(tEΣσ2)] = Φ
′
2
. Moreover,
since d ∈ Chp then by Definition 50, we deduce that µ(Φ2, β2) = µ(Φ1, β1). Hence we can
conclude that µ′
2
= η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ2, β2). Lastly, since H2 = H1 and we already proved that Φ2
is an executed frame for S and D2 ∪ N2 ∪ H2, we deduce that Φ2 is a well formed frame for S,
D2, N2 and H2. This allows us to conclude.
Case d < Chp: In such a case, we define H2 = H1 ∪ {|Φ1| + 1} and D2, N2 such that D2 ∪
N2 = D1 ∪ N1 and for all i ∈ N2 (resp. D2), Φ2 0 tEiΣi (resp. Φ2 ⊢ tEiΣi). By Definition 47,
we know that (E,F) allows authentic (resp. confidential, secure) channels implies d ∈ Cha
(resp. Chc, Chs). Therefore, since δ1 = δ2 and σ1 = σ2 then by Definition 36, we deduce that
Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) = Φ
′
2
. Let us now focus on µ′
2
. We know that µ′
2
= rect(d, tApδ1(σ1), η2Apσ2(σ2) ◦
µ(Φ1, α1)). But if d < dom(µ1) then we need to look at µ(Φ1, α1). Since we defined β2 =
β1 ◦{((E,F),XEΣσ1)→ d}, Φ2 = Φ · [EΣσ] and H2 = H1∪{|Φ1|+1}, we deduce by definition that
µ(Φ2, β2) = rect(d, tEΣApδ1(σ), µ(Φ1, β1)). Since µ1 = µ2, δ2 = δ1 and dom(µ1) ∩ img(β2) = ∅,
we deduce that rect(d, tEΣApδ1(σ1), η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ1, β1)) = η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ2, β2) = µ
′
2
.
It remains to prove that Φ2 is a well formed frame for S, D2, N2 and H2. We already know
that σ1 is an executed substitution for Φ1 and Σ does not contain tagA-tagged term. Therefore,
since Φ2 = Φ1 · [EΣσ1] then we deduce that Φ2 is an executed frame for D2 ∪ N2 ∪ H2. Let
us prove that for all v ∈ XEΣσ1, Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) 0 Apδ2(v) and Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ FApδ2(Σσ1). We
know (Trα(P0), ∅, id)
Apδ2
(tr2)
=====⇒Apδ2 (σ2)
(Trα2(Q2)Apδ2(σ2),Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2), η2Apδ2(σ2) ◦ µ(Φ2, β2)),
(Trα(P0), ∅, id) is secure and there exists ta such that ev(d, ta,XEΣσ1,FΣσ1) ∈ tr1 with all agents
in ta are honest. Hence, applying Definition 44 allows us to conclude.
Rule In: In such a case, Q1 = Q | inA(c, v).RA, Φ2 = Φ1, µ2 = µ1 and there exists σ such that
dom(σ) = vars(vσ1) and either vσ1σ ∈ cµ1 or else c ∈ Chp ∪ Chc and Φ1 ⊢ vσ1σ. Moreover, we
have P2 = Qσ1 | RAσ1σ and σ2 = σ1σ. Let us first define Q2 = Q | RA. In such a case, we deduce
Q2σ2 = P2.
Let us now define δ2 = δ1 ∪ δ
′ where δ′ is an injective mapping from tagA-terms that are in σ
but not in σ1 or Φ1 to fresh names ofND. In such a case, we directly have that δ2 is a tagA-mapping
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of Φ2 and σ2. Moreover, let us define tr2 = tr1, D2 = D1, N2 = N1, H2 = H1, α2 = α1, β2 = β1,
η2 = η1. We directly have thatΦ2 is a well formed frame forS, D2, N2 and H2. Sinceσ2 = σ1σ, then
following Definition 49,we deduce that Q2,Φ2, α2, β2, tr2 and σ2 have conforming events. Moreover
we also derive that η2σ2 = η1σ1σ = µ1σ = µ1 = µ2.
We now show that σ2 is an executed substitution forΦ2. We know that either vσ2 ∈ cη1σ1 or else
Φ1 ⊢ vσ2. In the former case, since η1 only contains fully tagB-terms, we deduce that all tagA-tagged
subterms of vσ2 is a subterm of σ1 and so the result holds since σ1 is an executed substitution for
Φ1 = Φ2. In the latter case, Φ1 ⊢ vσ2 and Lemma 30 directly allow us to conclude.
Since Q is an initial process, by Definition 47, we deduce that either v is a fully tagB-tagged term
and c < img(α1) ∪ img(δ1) or v = EΣ and c = cpub ∈ Chp where Σ is a fully tagB-tagged substitution
and (E,F) is an encapsulation. To prove the last property, we do a case analysis:
Case v is a tagB-tagged term and c < img(α1) ∪ img(δ1): Since Q1 = Q | inA(c, v).RA and
α1 = α2, we deduce that Trα1(Q1) = Trα2(Q) | inA(c, v).Trα2 (RA). But if vσ2 ∈ cη1σ1 then
Apδ1(vσ1σ) ∈ Apδ1(cη1σ1). But v and η1 only containing fully tagB-terms implies that Apδ1(vσ1σ) =
vApδ1(σ1)Apδ1(σ) and Apδ1(cη1σ1) = cη1Apδ1(σ1). By definition of δ2, we have that Apδ1(σ) =
Apδ2(σ) and so by considering the substitution Apδ2(σ), we deduce that:
(Trα1 (Q1)Apδ1(σ1),Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1), η1Apδ1(σ1) ◦ µ(Φ1, β1))
→
(Trα2 (Q2)Apδ2(σ2),Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2), η1Apδ1(σ1) ◦ µ(Φ2, β2))
The mapping η1Apδ1(σ1) being ground, we have η1Apδ1(σ1) = η1Apδ1(σ1) = η1Apδ2(σ1)Apδ2(σ) =
η2Apδ2(σ2). This allows us to conclude.
Let us now consider the case where Φ1 ⊢ vσ2. We know that δ2 = δ1δ
′, Φ1 = Φ2, D2 =
D1, N2 = N2 and H2 = H1. Hence Tr
H1,δ1
D1∪N1,∅
(Φ1) = Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2). By Lemma 41, we deduce
that Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ Apδ2(vσ2). Once again since v is a fully tagB-tagged term, we deduce that
Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ vApδ2(σ2). Therefore, by considering the substitution Apδ2(σ), the result holds.
Case v = EΣ and c = cpub ∈ Chp: In this case, by Definition 49, we deduce that there ex-
ists a channel d such that ((E,F),XEΣ)α1 = d. Thus, we deduce that Trα1(Q1) = Trα2(Q2) |
inA(d, tEΣ).Trα2 (RA). Moreover, since c ∈ Chp, we deduce that c < dom(µ1) and Φ1 ⊢ vσ1σ. To
conclude the result, we show that
if d ∈ Chp then Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ tEΣApδ2(σ2)
if d ∈ Chc then tEΣApδ2(σ2) ∈ dµ(Φ2, β2) or Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ tEΣApδ2(σ2)
if d ∈ Cha ∪ Chs then tEΣApδ2(σ2) ∈ dµ(Φ2, β2).
But using the same reasoning as in the case of the rule Out with (Trα0 (P0), ∅, id) being secure and
the execution (P0, ∅, id)
tr
=⇒σ (P,Φ, µ) being well-formed, we can deduce that if d ∈ Chp then for all
k ∈ H, XEkApδ2 (Σk)∩XEΣApδ2(σ2) = ∅. However, if d ∈ Chc∪Cha∪Chs then there exists k ∈ H such
that XEkApδ2(Σk) = XEΣApδ2(σ2). Moreover, we also know that d ∈ Chc (resp. Cha ∪ Chs) implies
that (E,F) allows (resp. does not allow) confidential channels. Thus, by applying Lemma 43, we
deduce that:
if d ∈ Chp then Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ tEΣApδ2(σ2).
if d ∈ Chc then either there exists k ∈ H such that Ek ∼ E and EkApδ2(Σk) = EΣApδ2(σ2) or
Tr
H2,δ2
D2∪N2,∅
(Φ2) ⊢ tEΣApδ2(σ2). In the former case, by Definition 50, it implies that tEΣApδ2(σ2) ∈
dµ(Φ2, β2) hence the result holds.
if d ∈ Cha ∪ Chs then there exists k ∈ H such that Ek ∼ E and EkApδ2(Σk) = EΣApδ2(σ2) and so
as previously, it implies that tEΣApδ2(σ2) ∈ dµ(Φ2, β2).
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Rule New-k: In such a case, Q1 = Q | new x.RA, Φ2 = Φ1, µ2 = µ1 and P2 = Qσ1 | RAσ1{
k/x}
where k is a fresh name in NH if A ∈ AgtH else k ∈ ND. Therefore, the result trivially holds
with Q2 = Q | RA{
k/x}, Φ2 = Φ1, δ2 = δ1, η2 = η1, D2 = D1, N2 = N1, H2 = H1, β2 = β1 and
α2 = {((E,F),XEΣ{
k/x}) → c | ((E,F),XEΣ)α1 = c}.
Rule New-c: In such a case, Q1 = Q | new c.Q
′, Φ2 = Φ1, µ2 = µ1 and P2 = Qσ1 | RAσ1{
c′/c}
where c′ is name in Cha (resp. Chc, Chs) if c ∈ Cha (resp. Chc, Chs) and for all I ∈ AgtD, c ∈ chI(Q
′)
else c′ ∈ Chp. Therefore, the result trivially holds with Q2 = Q | RA{
c′/c}, Φ2 = Φ1, δ2 = δ1, η2 = η1,
D2 = D1, N2 = N1, H2 = H1, β2 = β1 and α2 = α1{
c′/c}.
Rule Repl: In such a case, Q1 = Q |!Q
′ where dom(σ1) ∩ vars(Q
′) = ∅, Φ2 = Φ1, µ2 = µ1 and
P2 = Qσ1 |!Q
′ | Qρ where ρ is a fresh renaming of variables in Q′. We also know that the variables
in Q1 are bound once. Therefore, the result trivially holds with Q2 = Q |!Q
′ | Qρ, Φ2 = Φ1, δ2 = δ1,
η2 = η1, D2 = D1, N2 = N1, H2 = H1, β2 = β1 and α2 = α1◦{((E,F),XEΣρ) → c | ((E,F),XEΣ)α1 = c
and vars(img(Σ)) ∩ dom(ρ) , ∅}.
Other rules: Trivial. ◭
Let S be a set of channels. We say that two process P and Q are composable under S and C′
if P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn], Q = C
′[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n] and C[_] = C
′[_]|S for some contexts C[_],C
′[_] and for
some roles Ri,R
′
i
of the same agent, for i = 1 . . .n.
◮ Theorem 17. Let tagA and tagB be two disjoint sets of tags. Let Se be a set of tagA-encapsulation
allowing authentic, confidential, and secure channels. Let ρ be a mapping from channels to TAgt×Se.
Let P and Q be two closed executable composable tagB-processes under ρ such that P and Q do not
share names and f a(P) = f a(Q) = ∅. Let P˜ be an annotation of P under ρ. If P˜ is secure and Q
preserves secrecy then P˜ ·ρ Q preserves secrecy as well.
Proof. Since P andQ are composable under ρ, let us denote P = C[R1, . . . ,Rn] andQ = C
′[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n].
Moreover, following Definition 13, let us denote P˜ ·ρ Q = C0[R1.R
′′
1
, . . . ,Rn.R
′′
n ] where C0 = C
C,C′ |S
and R′′
1
, . . . ,R′′n are defined as described in Definition 13 with P˜ = C[R1.ev1(c1, ta1, ts1, tp1), . . . ,
R˜n.evn(cn, tan, tsn, tpn)].
Let us consider C˜,C1 two contexts such that C˜ and C
′ are composable; and C˜|S = C. Let us
denote C1 = C
C˜,C′ . Note that C0 = C1|S . Lastly, let us define γ a bijective mapping from S to fresh
channels of same kind, that is cθ ∈ Cha (resp. Chc,Chs) is equivalent to c ∈ Cha (resp. Chc,Chs).
We denote by P0 = C1[R˜1.R
′′
1
, . . . , R˜n.R
′′
n ]. We first show that for all execution (P˜ ·
ρ Q, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr
=⇒
(P′,Φ, µ)θ there exists P′′ and tr′ such that (P0, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr′
=⇒ (P′′,Φ, µ)θ is a well-formed execution
and tr is the trace tr′ where we removed the events of the form ev(c, ta, ts, tp, d) with ev ∈ E˜v.
By construction, the differences between P0 and P˜ ·
ρ Q lie the addition of some channel declara-
tions in C0 and the some events. But the declared channels are not used in any output or input of Ri
and R′′
i
. Thus, we trivially have that for all execution (P˜ ·ρ Q, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr
=⇒ (P′,Φ, µ)theta there exists
P′′ and tr′ such that (P0, ∅, ∅, θ)
tr′
=⇒ (P′′,Φ, µ, θ) and tr is the trace tr′ where we removed the events
of the form ev(c, ta, ts, tp, d) with ev ∈ E˜v. The existence of a well-formed execution is then given
by Lemma 46.
We now show that P0 is an initial process and that there exists α0 a mapping of channels for P0
such that Trα0 (P0) = C1[R˜1.R
′
1
, . . . , R˜n.R
′
n]. We already know that P and Q are fully tagB-tagged pro-
cesses. Moreover, by Definition 13, we know that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, R′′
i
is the process R′
i
where
some instances of outA(c, u) (resp. inA(c, u)) are replaced by outA(cpub,Eσ) (resp. inA(cpub,Eσ))
when cρ = (ta, (E,F)) and eventA(e˜vi(d, ta,XEσ,Fσ, c)) is in R˜i for some substitution σ. By Defini-
tion 47, we deduce that P0 is initial.
50 Secure refinements of communication channels
Moreover, let us define α0 such mapping such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all instances of
outA(c, u) (resp. inA(c, u)) in R
′
i
, if eventA(evi(d, ta,XEσ,Fσ, c)) is in R˜i and cρ = (ta, (E,F)) for
some ta, c, (E,F) then ((E,F),XEσ)α0 = c. Since by Definition 9, cρ = (ta, (E,F)) implies that
c ∈ Cha (resp. Chc,Chs) is equivalent to (E,F) allows authentic (resp. confidential, secure) channels.
Therefore, we can deduce from Definition 48 that α0 is a mapping of channels for P0. Lastly,
following Definition 48 and Definition 13, we directly obtain that Trα0(P0) = C1[R˜1.R
′
1
, . . . , R˜n.R
′
n].
Let us now prove that (Trα0 (P0), ∅, ∅, ∅) is secure. We know that P˜ is secure. But the properties
of Definition 16 are all reachability properties which are preserved by parallel composition. Hence,
we have that (P˜ | Q, ∅, ∅, ∅) = (C[R˜1, . . . , R˜n] | C
′[R′
1
, . . . ,R′n], ∅, ∅, ∅) is secure. But we know that P
and Q do not share any names and channels(C1)∩ channels(R1, . . . ,Rn)∩ channels(R
′
1
, . . . ,R′n) = ∅.
Thus, a simple induction allows us to prove that (C1[R˜1.R
′
1
, . . . , R˜n.R
′
n], ∅, id,=)(Trα0(P0), ∅, ∅)∅ is
secure.
With the same reasoning as above, we can prove that (C1[R˜1.R
′
1
, . . . , R˜n.R
′
n], ∅, ∅, ∅) = (Trα0 (P0),
∅, ∅, ∅) preserves the secrecy of some term t shared by some agents A1, . . . , An. We now show that
(P0, ∅, id) also preserves the secrecy of t shared by A1, . . . , An.
Let (P0, ∅, ∅, ∅)
tr
=⇒σ (P
′,Φ, µ)θ a well formed execution, and agent B and an eventSec(t′, (A′
1
, . . . , A′n))
such that (B,Sec(t′, (A′
1
, . . . , A′n))) ∈ tr and Φ ⊢ t
′. By Lemma 51, we deduce that there exists an
initial process U, a mapping of channels α (resp. β) for U (resp. Φ), and η, δ, D, N and H such that:
Uσ = P; and
ησ = µ and η only contains fully tagB-terms; and
U, Φ, α, β, tr and σ have conforming events; and
Φ is a well formed frame for Se, D, N and H; and
σ is an executed substitution for Φ; and
δ is a tagA-mapping of Φ and σ; and
(Trα(P0), ∅, ∅, ∅)
Apδ(tr)
====⇒Apδ(σ) (Trα(U)Apδ(σ),Tr
H,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ), ηApδ(σ) ◦ µ(Φ, β), θ)
But (B,Sec(t′, (A′
1
, . . . , A′n))) ∈ tr implies that (B,Sec(Apδ(t
′), (A′
1
, . . . , A′n))) ∈ Apδ(tr). Moreover,
by Lemma 41 and Definition 36, Φ ⊢ t′ implies that TrH,δ
D∪N,∅
(Φ) ⊢ Apδ(t
′). This is a contradiction
with the fact that (Trα0 (P0), ∅, ∅, ∅) also preserves the secrecy of t shared by A1, . . . , An. Therefore,
(P0, ∅, ∅, ∅) indeed preserves the secrecy of t shared by A1, . . . , An.
Note that in P0 the channels channels(C1)rchannels(C) do not appear in any R˜i.R
′′
i
, for i = 1..n.
As such, removing them still preserves the secrecy of t shared by A1, . . . , An. Lastly, for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, the difference between R˜i and Ri is the addition of some event ev that are different from
the event Sec, removing them also preserves secrecy meaning that C[R1.R
′′
1
, . . . ,Rn.R
′′
n ] = P˜ ·
ρ Q
preserves the secrecy of t shared by A1, . . . , An. This allows us to conclude. ◭
